University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2006

Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power
Curtis A. Bradley
Eric A. Posner

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bradley, Curtis A. and Posner, Eric A., "Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power" (2006). Constitutional Commentary. 148.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/148

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Articles

PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
AND EXECUTIVE POWER
Curtis A. Bradley*
Eric A. Posner**
A recent debate about the Bush administration's use of
presidential signing statements has raised questions
about their function, legality, and value. We argue that
presidential signing statements are legal and that they
provide a useful way for the president to disclose his
views about the meaning and constitutionality of legislation. In addition, basic tenets of positive political
theory suggest that signing statements do not undermine the separation of powers or the legislative process and that, under certain circumstances, they can
provide relevant evidence of statutory meaning. Although President Bush has raised many more constitutional challenges within his signing statements than
prior presidents have, at least on their face these challenges are similar to challenges made by other recent
presidents, such as President Clinton. Whether Bush's
views of executive power are significantly different
from Clinton's, and if so, whether they are inferior,
remain open questions, but these issues are independent of whether signing statements are lawful.
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I. INTRODUCfiON

Presidential signing statements are short documents that
presidents often issue when they sign a bill. They first appeared
about two centuries ago, and they have been used routinely since
the New Deal. Presidents use signing statements to describe a
bill in general terms; to explain its purpose; to praise the bill's
sponsors or supporters; to criticize Congress for going too far or
not far enough in addressing the problem the bill is supposed to
solve; to advance particular interpretations of specific provisions
of the bill; to explain how officials in the executive branch will
implement the bill; to explain how the bill will interact with existing statutes; and to remind Congress of the president's constitutional powers. A brief controversy about the Reagan administration's use of signing statements to supplement legislative
history flared up in the mid-1980s but had no lasting effect. 1
Hundreds of signing statements have been issued since then but
until recently no one paid much attention to them. All this
changed about a year ago, and suddenly the signing statement, as
an institution, has become a topic of heated political debate.
In December 2005, President Bush signed into law the Detainee Treatment Act, which among other things prohibits the
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" of anyone in U.S. custody. In a signing statement, Bush stated that he
would construe the prohibition "in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary
executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent
with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power," suggesting to some people that he might not comply with the prohibition.2 In March 2006, President Bush issued a signing statement for the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, in which he
asserted that he had the authority to ignore certain reporting requirements.3 Both of these events caught the attention of the
media. Also, in January 2006, during Justice Samuel Alito's con1. Commentators at that time debated the legitimacy of using signing statements
to express views about a statute's meaning. Compare Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive
Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (1987) (criticizing this practice),
with Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential
"Signing Statements," 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209 (1988) (defending this practice).
2. See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005).
3. See Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 425 (Mar. 9, 2006).
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firmation hearings, it was revealed that, as a Justice Department
lawyer in the Reagan administration, Alito had drafted a memo
considering how to implement a proposal to use signing statements more frequently to address questions of statutory interpretation.4 Alita's critics argued that the memo showed that, as
a Supreme Court justice, he would be too friendly to the executive branch.
The next step was to link together what might have remained episodic controversies, and connect them to the widely
credited claim that the Bush administration had taken extreme
positions on executive authority in its legal defense of its war-onterror policies. Several members of the media made this connection early on, 5 but the spark was applied to the fuel on April 30,
2006, when a Boston Globe article asserted that Bush had "quietly claimed the authority to disregard more than 750 laws enacted since he took office," far more than any other president. 6
This article provoked further controversy, including increasingly
strident condemnations of the signing statement in the media. 7
In early June, the American Bar Association appointed a task
force "to examine constitutional and legal issues raised by the
practice of presidents of the United States of attaching legal interpretations to federal legislation they sign." 8 On June 27, the
Senate held hearings on the signing statement, during which Republican Arlen Specter expressed concerns about Bush's signing
statements, and Democrat Patrick Leahy called them a "grave
threat to our constitutional system of checks and balances. "9
Academics have also leapt into the fray. 10 And in July 2006, the
4. See Christopher Lee, A/ito Once Made Case for Presidential Power, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 2, 2006, at All; Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Litigation Strategy Working Group (Feb.
5, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89269/ Acc060-89-269-box6-SG- LS WG-Ali totoLSW G-Feb 1986. pdf.
5. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Sign Here: Presidential Signing Statements Are More Than
Just Execwive Branch Lunacy, SLATE, Jan. 30,2006, http://www.slateuk.com/id/2134919/.
6. Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws; President Cites Powers of
His Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al.
7. See, e.g., Editorial, Veto? Who Needs a Veto?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A22;
Elizabeth Drew, Power Grab, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 22, 2006, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19092.
8. American Bar Association, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and
the Separation of Powers Doctrine, http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/ (last
visited Dec. 2, 2006).
9. Jonathan Weisman, Bush's Challenges of Laws He Signed Is Criticized, WASH.
PosT, June 28, 2006, at A9.
10. See, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allen Poe, and the Use and
Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515 (2005) [hereinafter Cooper, Use and Abuse]; Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the President's Au-
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ABA task force issued a statement "oppos[ing] as contrary to
the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of
powers, a President's issuance of signing statements to claim the
authority or state the intention to disregard or decline to enforce
all or part of a law he has signed, or to interpret such a law in a
manner inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress. " 11
The attack on the institution of signing statements is puzzling.
Signing statements provide public information about a president's
views of a statute and thus would seem to promote dialogue and
accountability. Furthermore, courts pay little attention to signing
statements; as a result, it is not clear how they can increase the
president's authority vis-a-vis Congress. Some critics have pointed
out that signing statements are sometimes instructions to subordinates, and so an aggressive signing statement could, in theory, direct officials in the executive branch, including prosecutors and
agency personnel, not to enforce statutes on the basis of dubious
constitutional theories. 12 But it is already widely recognized that
the president has considerable authority to allocate enforcement
resources by giving priority to some statutes and not to others,
and to order his agents to enforce statutes according to his interpretations of them. He certainly does not need a signing statement
to do this; he could just write a memorandum to his subordinates.
If his subordinates fail to enforce the law properly, they might be
compelled to act by courts, or Congress might retaliate; whether
the failure was the result of a signing statement or some other order or document is immaterial.
All of this suggests that the real concern is not with the institution of signing statements but with the Bush administration's
underlying views of executive power. Unfortunately, the media
and even much of the academic work on signing statements ignore this distinction, and instead imply that the signing statement is intrinsically suspect. The ABA task force report, for exthority to Refuse to Enforce the Law (American Constitution Society for Law and Policy,
June 2006), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kinkopf-Signing%20Statements
%20and%20Prcsident's%20Authority.pdf; Richard A. Epstein, The Problem with Presidential Signing Statements, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 16, 2006, at 5.
11. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE, REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements
/aba_final_signlng_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf [hereinafter ABA
TASK FORCE]. The ABA's House of Delegates approved the task force's proposed resolutions, after amending them to make clear that what was opposed was the "misuse" of
signing statements. The amended version is available at http://www.coherentbabble.
com/signingstatements/ ABAresolamended.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 10; Epstein, supra note 10.
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ample, offers itself as a critique of the signing statement but is
really an argument that the president has an obligation to enforce all statutes that are enacted- an entirely different argument which, incidentally, is much more complex than the task
force's two-page analysis suggests. 13 A possible reason for this
state of affairs is that the Bush administration's constitutional
claims are extremely hard to evaluate, as a matter of political
and constitutional theory, so it is tempting to use the signing
statement as a kind of proxy for the Bush administration's underlying constitutional claims. The number of challenges in the
signing statements is taken as a quantitative index of the Bush
administration's excesses, with the extreme nature of a few of
the signing statements used to bolster this claim. In a now forgotten episode of the Clinton administration, Republican critics
similarly complained that Clinton issued too many executive orders and directives to agencies, and used them to circumvent
Congress's powers. 14 The problem with this argument is the
same as the problem with the argument against signing statements: the relevant question is not how many documents are issued, but the content of the documents, which is much harder to
criticize and evaluate than the number.
In this article, we try to clear up some of the controversy
over signing statements in general and the Bush administration's
use of them in particular. In doing so, we make two principal
contributions to the debate. First, we present a more nuanced
empirical assessment of the Bush administration's use of signing
statements, focusing in particular on a quantitative and qualitative comparison of the signing statement practices of President
Bush and President Clinton. Second, we use positive political
theory- the most sophisticated work on legislative institutions
13. See ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 18-19. We criticize the arguments below. For now, we will just point out that the task force makes the broad argument that
the President can never refuse to enforce statutes that he believes are unconstitutional,
without attempting to reconcile this position with the substantial legal and historical materials that suggest the contrary, including materials surveyed in an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum by Walter Dellinger that the task force cites and quotes from. See id. at
13. At one point in its report, however, the task force appears to recognize that sometimes it will be appropriate for a president to decline to enforce a statutory provision he
believes to be unconstitutional. See id. at 23.
14. See KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS
AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 219 (2001); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2294-95 (2001). For some Clinton-era media reports, see Jonathan
Weisman, Wielding the Power of the President's Pen, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 22, 1999, at
3A; Editorial, The Intruders, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2000, at A22 ("This final year is going
to bring a paroxysm of regulatory intrusion-through agency actions or Mr. Clinton's
continued abuse of executive orders.").
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and statutory interpretation-to assess the institutional implications of signing statements.
Part II briefly describes the history of signing statements and
considers in some detail the Bush administration's practice. Although President Bush has not issued an unusual number of signing statements, he has challenged an unusually high number of
statutory provisions within his statements. Critics contend that this
behavior shows that the Bush administration has significantly
broader views of executive power than prior presidents. While
this contention might be true, the text of the signing statements do
not by themselves provide compelling support for it. For the most
part, the claims made in President Bush's signing statementsincluding claims relating to the "unitary executive" -are similar to
the claims made by other recent presidents, such as President
Clinton. In addition, there are other plausible explanations for the
Bush administration's high number of challenges.
In Part III, we reject the legal criticisms of the signing
statement that have been advanced by a few scholars, politicians,
and journalists. This is mainly a stage-setting exercise because it
turns out that the most plausible critiques of the signing statement are not formalistic legal arguments but are ones based on
more general institutional concerns. Part IV addresses these institutional arguments, which can be found mainly in the positive
political theory literature. We argue that these institutional arguments, on inspection, turn out to be weak and that the institution of the signing statement does not present a serious threat to
either the separation of powers or the legislative process.
II. THE SIGNING STATEMENT: BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY PRIOR TO BUSH II
Presidents have issued signing statements since early in U.S.
history, starting with James Monroe. 15 Despite early historical
precedent, the signing statement did not come into widespread
use until the twentieth century. According to statistics compiled
by the political scientist Christopher Kelley, Hoover issued 12
signing statements; FDR issued 51; Truman issued 118; Eisenhower issued 145; Kennedy issued 80; and Johnson issued 302.
15. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 929 n.294 (1994); Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement 57 (2003)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University).
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The remaining presidents up until Bush II issued between 100
and 400 signing statements during their administrations, averaging about 35 to 60 per year. 16
Presidents use signing statements for diverse purposes.
Many signing statements express general policy views without
asserting that the bill must be interpreted or limited in some
fashion. President Truman, for example, declared that various
provisions of the Displaced Persons Act (which granted visas to
certain people displaced by hostilities during World War II)
"form a pattern of discrimination and intolerance wholly inconsistent with the American sense of justice." 17 Presidents frequently sign legislation while declaring that the legislation does
not go far enough toward solving the problem at hand, and requesting Congress to consider additional legislative proposals in
the future. In his signing statement for the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, President Clinton complained
that Congress did not adopt many of his proposals, including
provisions to expand the wiretapping authority of law enforcement agencies and to ban "cop-killer bullets," and asked Congress to reconsider its decisions in future legislation. 18 Many
other signing statements have thanked constituents, praised or
condemned members of Congress, and praised members of the
executive branch as well as the administration itself. 19 These
types of signing statements have political value but no legal effect, and so we will not address them further.
The kinds of signing statements that have produced controversy in recent years also have substantial precedents in earlier
administrations. We can divide these signing statements into two
types. First, constitutional signing statements declare that the
president will interpret a statute narrowly in order to avoid constitutional difficulties or not enforce a provision that the president
believes is unconstitutional. President Truman interpreted a bill
that provided for loans to Spain as an "authorization" rather than
as a "directive" apparently because he believed that the latter

16. Kelley, supra note 15, at 192. We rely heavily on Kelley's valuable history in this
part. Other useful sources on the history of signing statements include PHILLIP J.
COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT
ACTION (2002); May, supra note 15, at 928-69.
17. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Displaced Persons Act, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 382,383 (June 25, 1948).
18. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 24, 1996).
19. COOPER, supra note 16, at 213-15.
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would violate his constitutional power over foreign affairs. 20
Presidents Ford and Carter frequently used si~ning statements to
deny the constitutionality of legislative vetoes. President Reagan
stated that a statutory provision that purported not to recognize
the PLO would be interpreted as nonbinding because otherwise it
would conflict with the president's recognition power. 22 President
Clinton stated that the Department of Justice would not enforce a
provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that prohibited
the transmission of certain abortion-related speech over the
Internet because the provision violated the First Amendment. 23
Second, interpretive (or legislative history) signing statements
argue that ambiguous provisions of a statute have a particular
meaning, based on what the president understands (or claims)
the purpose of the statute to have been. President Truman interpreted a labor statute that provided an ambiguous good-faith defense to employers so that the employer would have the burden
of proof and could not avoid liability merely by showing that it
did not intend to violate a rule.Z 4 President Reagan interpreted a
supplemental appropriations bill so that its restrictions on the
promulgation of regulations would apply only to the type of
regulations specifically identified in the bill and not to the regulatory program to which they were related.Z 5 President George
H.W. Bush's signing statement for the Civil Rights Act of 1991
advanced a narrow definition of disparate impact by endorsinR
the statement of a Republican senator in the legislative history.
President Clinton provided an interpretation of an ambiguous
term in the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, saying
only that his interpretation was "[ c)onsistent with the clear intent of the Act." 27 In these cases, the president provides his understanding of what the bill means, without trying to appeal to
his constitutional powers.

20. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to Bernard
M. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President app. at para. 9 (Nov. 3, 1993), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm.
21. Kelley, supra note 15, at 76.
22. !d. at 45 (citing Statement on Signing the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 2 PUB. PAPERS 983 (Aug. 8, 1985)).
23. Kelley, supra note 15, at 156.
24. !d. at 62 (citing Statement on Signing Hobbs Bill, 1 Pus. PAPERS 336 (July 3,
1946)).
25. Statement on Signing the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986, 2
Pl'B. PAPERS 906 (July 2, 1986).
26. Kelley, supra note 15, at 134-35.
27. Statement on Signing the Federal Workforce Manufacturing Act of 1994, 1
PUB. PAPERS 561 (March 30, 1994).
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Christopher Kelley argues that the history of the use of the
signing statement reflects the rise of the theory of the "unitary
executive," which he traces to the Reagan administration? 8 We
would put the argument differently. The increase in the frequency of the use of the signing statement is related to the rise of
the national government beginning with the New Deal and the
concomitant transfer of power from Congress to the president.
As the federal government became larger and claimed for itself
greater power over areas of life traditionally left to the states, it
became necessary for Congress to pass more, or more farreaching or comprehensive, statutes. With more statutes, there
would be more opportunities for conflict between Congress's
and the president's constitutional powers, and more sources of
legislative ambiguity. Relatedly, this period also saw the creation
of independent agencies with an uncertain relationship to presidential authority. Presidents have naturally sought to defend
their constitutional prerogatives and to advance interpretations
of ambiguous statutes that might otherwise be applied inconsistently with these prerogatives. The signing statement became an
instrument with which they have discharged these functions.
At the same time, as the national government grew, much of
the day-to-day regulatory power moved from Congress to the
president. Congress created enormous agencies, placed them in
the executive branch, and ordered the agencies to issue regulations. Congress transferred this authority to the executive because it lacked the institutional capacity to make the kind of dayto-day regulation that it believed necessary in a modern, national
economy, but it also tried to retain as much oversight control as
it could. These efforts led to repeated clashes with presidents,
who were willing to administer the regulatory edifice but believed that congressional micromanaging violated their constitutional powers. Signing statements became one of the ways that
presidents have asserted their constitutional understandings.
Thus, the increasingly frequent use of signing statements since
FDR can be attributed to the gradual transfer of authority from
Congress to the president as well as the growth of the national
government itself. Indeed, many other indicia of executive
power also increased during this period. For example, presidents
used executive orders very rarely in the nineteenth century, but

28. Kelley, supra note 15, at 184. For discussion of this theory, sec infra note 74 and
accompanying text.
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frequently during the twentieth, with their greatest use occurring
during the FDR and Truman administrations. 29
The Reagan administration continued the practice of earlier
administrations but in a somewhat more aggressive fashion.
Reagan's attorney general, Edwin Meese, argued more vigorously and explicitly than any of his predecessors that the president's views on the Constitution, whether put in signing statements or elsewhere, should be given significant weight. 30 Meese
also argued that signing statements were a legitimate form of
legislative history, on which courts should rely when interpreting
statutes, regardless of whether the signing statement reflects the
president's constitutional or policy views about the statute in
question. 31 We conjecture that the rise of this more aggressive
use of the signing statement resulted from efforts to reclaim executive power in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the
congressional reaction of the 1970s, which involved the enactment of numerous laws intended to constrain the executiveincluding the War Powers Resolution, the Forei9n Intelligence
Surveillance Act, and the Anti-Impoundment Act. 2
B. BUSH II

Like the signing statements of other recent presidents,
President Bush's signing statements fall into three overlapping
categories: statements made for public relations or political purposes; statements that express constitutional objections to or
concerns about statutory provisions and thereby either suggest
that they are not binding on the president or that they will be interpreted in a manner that avoids the objection or concern; and
statements that express a view about the meaning of an ambiguous statutory provision.
Bush has often used signing statements at least partially for
political or public relations purposes. For example, of the
twenty-four signing statements that Bush issued in 2001, half of
them were purely for political or public relations purposes, although it appears that there are fewer pure politicaVpublic relations signing statements in subsequent years. In signing into law
29. See MAYER, supra note 14, at 71.
30. See COOPER, supra note 16, at 201-03; Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitwion, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987).
31. The academic debate of the time focused on the question whether a signing
statement reflecting policy should be used as legislative history and neglected the constitutional signing statement, which is the focus of the debate today.
32. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 423 (2004).
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a bill that repealed a regulation concerning ergonomics, Bush
stated that the "measure repeals an unduly burdensome and
overly broad regulation" and further criticized the regulation as
something that "would have cost both large and small employers
billions of dollars and presented employers with overwhelming
compliance challenges. " 33 This statement made no claim about
the meaning of statutory provisions and did not raise any constitutional objections about the bill. Similarly, in signing a supplemental appropriations bill in 2001, Bush "commend[ed] the
Congress for expeditiously providing critical resources needed to
improve our support for our men and women in the military
while maintaining a strict fiscal discipline." 34 The use of signing
statements to make these sorts of political or public relations
statements is not controversial.
Many of Bush's signing statements refer to constitutional
objections or concerns implicated by one or more statutory provisions (often in addition to making public relations statements).
These constitutional objections typically relate to asserted encroachments on executive authority. For example, Bush's statements have objected to:
• Provisions directing the executive branch to submit proposals or recommendations to Congress on particular topics,
on the ground that they interfere with the constitutional authority of the president to recommend "such measures as
the President shall judge necessary or expedient. "35
• Restrictions on the president's ability to appoint officers
or vest appointment authority in entities other than the
president, on the ground that they violate the Appointments Clause. 36
• Provisions requiring the submission of information to
Congress, on the ground that they may interfere with the
president's authority to withhold information for various
reasons, such as harm to national security. 37
33. Statement on Signing Legislation To Repeal Federal Ergonomics Regulations, 1
PUB. PAPERS 269, 269 (Mar. 20, 2001).
34. Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY 2001, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 908, 908 (July 24, 2001).
35. See, e.g., Statement on Signing Legislation to Provide for Improvement of Federal Education Research, Statistics, Evaluation, Information, and Dissemination, and for
Other Purposes, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1995, 1995 (Nov. 5, 2002).
36. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2006,41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1800 (Nov. 30, 2005).
37. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
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Provisions directing the executive branch to take particular positions in international negotiations or before international bodies, or to report on international negotiations, on the ground that they interfere with the
president's management of foreign affairs. 38
• Limitations on the use of U.S. armed forces, on the
ground that they interfere with the president's Commander in Chief authority. 39
• Provisions that regulate how actions are to be taken
within the executive branch, on the ground that they interfere with the president's authority to supervise the
"unitary executive branch. " 40
• Legislative veto and approval provisions on the ground
that they are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha. 41
Many of Bush's signing statements refer to multiple constitutional concerns, with the highest number often being raised in connection with appropriations bills. In signing an appropriations bill in
November 2001, for example, Bush raised constitutional concerns
about requirements regarding the organization of the Department of
Justice's efforts to combat terrorism; a requirement that the president submit a legislative proposal to Congress concerning compensation for victims of terrorism; and a prohibition on the use of appropriated funds for cooperation with, or assistance or other support to,
the International Criminal Court. He also noted at the end of his
signing statement that "several other provisions of the bill unconstitutionally constrain my authority regarding the conduct of diplomacy
and my authority as Commander-in-Chief," and that he would "aption Act of2004, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2993 (Dec. 17, 2004).
38. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1658 (Sept. 30, 2002); Statement on Signing
the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2006,41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1718 (Nov. 14, 2005).
39. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2673 (Oct. 28, 2004).
40. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 40
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2924 (Dec. 8, 2004).
41. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1576 (Nov. 10,
2003). For additional discussion of the types of constitutional concerns raised in President Bush's signing statements, see Time Change-Presidential Signing Statements:
Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (June
27, 2006) [hereinafter Time Change] (statement of Michelle E. Boardman, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice), available at
http://judiciary.senatc.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1969; Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 10,
at 522.
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ply these provisions consistent with my constitutional responsibilities. "42 In his signing statements for the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2004 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Bush
43
referred to constitutional concerns relating to dozens of provisions.
Most of the time, when Bush has identified a constitutional
concern, he has stated that he will construe the statutory provision in question in a manner to avoid the concern. For example,
in signing the Animal Disease Risk Assessment, Prevention, and
Control Act of 2001, Bush noted that a section of the Act required the Secretary of Agriculture to submit certain reports to
committees and subcommittees of Congress, and he explained
that this section "will be interpreted in a manner consistent with
the constitutional authority of the President to recommend to
the consideration of the Congress such measures as the President shall judge necessary and expedient." 44 Similarly, in signing
an appropriations act for the Department of the Interior, he
noted that "[ s)everal provisions in the bill purport to require
congressional approval before executive branch execution of aspects of the bill," and that he would "interpret such provisions to
require notification only, since any other interpretation would
contradict the Supreme Court ruling in INS v. Chadha. " 45
For many of his constitutional objections, Bush has addressed the issue by interpreting statutory language that otherwise appears to be mandatory as being merely advisory. For example, in signing the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in
2002, he stated that a provision that called for the Department of
State to provide briefings to congressional committees concerning certain discussions with foreign governments
shall be construed as advisory only, given the constitutional
powers of the President to supervise the executive branch and
to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, which includes the authority to determine what information about international ne-

42. Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, 2 PL!B. PAPERS 1458, 1459
(Nov. 28, 2001).
43. Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, 40 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 137 (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/print.php?pid= 72537; Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2924 (Dec. 8, 2004).
44. Statement on Signing the Animal Disease Risk Assessment, Prevention, and
Control Act of 2001, 1 PUB. PAPERS 575,575 (May 24, 2001).
45. Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1346, 1346 (Nov. 5, 2001).
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gotiations may, in the public interest, be made available to the
Congress and when such disclosure should occur. 46

Similarly, in signing the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2002, he noted that a section of the bill "purports to
condition authorizations of certain appropriations on a subsequent determination by the Congress of the existence of successful progress by the executive branch toward specified goals," and
that "[t]he executive branch shall construe the purported condition as advisory, since any other construction would be inconsistent with the principles enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1983 in INS v. Chadha." 47
In some signing statements, Bush has indicated that he
would at least partially comply with statutory provisions that he
thought were constitutionally problematic, particularly provisions relating to notice or reporting to Congress, "as a matter of
comity." He did so, for example, in connection with the abovenoted objection to the reporting provision in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in 2002, stating "[t)he Secretary of
State will, however, as a matter of comity between the executive
and legislative branches, keep the Congress appropriately informed of the matters addressed by [this section]. " 48 Similarly, in
signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2004,
Bush noted that some sections "provide for notice to the Congress of relocation of activities between military installations, initiation of a new installation abroad, or U.S. military exercises involving $100,000 in construction costs," that "[t]he Supreme
Court of the United States has stated that the President's authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security flows from the Constitution and does not depend
upon a legislative grant of authority," and that "[a]lthough notice can be provided in most situations as a matter of comity,
situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in Chief while protect49
ing sensitive national security information. "
46. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 49, SO (Jan. 10,
2002).
47. Statement on Signing the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of
2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2178, 2178 (Dec. 19, 2002).
48. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 49, SO (Jan. 10,
2002).
49. Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2004, 39
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Bush has only rarely issued statements interpreting a statutory provision for non-constitutional reasons. He has done so to
address accidental references or omissions in statutory language.50 He has also occasionally done so to clarify statutory references.51 Most famously, in his signing statement for the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005, Bush asserted that the restrictions
on habeas corpus in the Act applied to pending cases, 52 a proposition subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. 53 In signing
the Corporate Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency
Act of 2002, also known as "Sarbanes-Oxley," Bush issued two
signing statements, one formal and the other informal. In the informal statement, he said that he would construe a whistleblower
protection provision narrowly. After subsequent pressure from
Congress and interest groups, the executive branch changed its
position and accepted a broader interpretation of the provision. 54
C. BUSH II V. CLINTON

It has been widely asserted that the Bush administration's
practice with respect to signing statements has been unusual in
nature and unprecedented in number. The press has frequently
reported that Bush has issued a record number of signing state-

WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. lliRO. !fiR() (Nov. 22, 2003).
50. See Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. ~22, ~22 (May 14, 2002) ("Section
2(4)(G) of the Act defines as a Federal Jaw enforcement agency the 'Coastal Security
Service.' Because no such agency exists, and the principal agency with coastal security
functions is the U.S. Coast Guard, the executive branch shall construe this provision as
referring to the Coast Guard."); Statement on Signing the Vicksburg National Military
Park Boundary Modification Act of 2002, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1745, 1741i
(Oct. 11, 2002) (noting that there was a missing word between "Secretary" and "add" and
concluding that Congress intended the missing word to be "shall").
51. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 40
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2l.J24, 2!)21i (Dec. 8, 2004) ("As is consistent with the principle of statutory construction of giving effect to each of two statutes addressing the same
subject whenever they can co-exist, the executive branch shall construe the provision in
the Energy and Water Appropriations Act under the heading 'National Nuclear Security
Administration, Weapons Activities' concerning transfer of funds from the Department
of Defense to constitute an 'express authorization of Congress' to which section 8063 of
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287) refers.").
52. See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005).
53. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764-69 (2006).
54. See Christopher S. Kelley, Rethinking Presidential Power-The Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency 34-39 (Apr. 2005) (paper prepared for the 63d
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association), available at http://
www. pe gc. us/archive/Unitary% 20Exccu ti ve/k ell y_unit_exec _a nd_bush. pdf.
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55

ments. As we noted earlier, it was also reported in April 2006
that President Bush had already asserted the authority to disregard "more than 750 laws since he took office," something "unprecedented in US history. " 56 Senator Specter has noted that,
"[t]here is a sense that the president has taken the signing statements far beyond the customary purview. " 57 The political scientist Phillip Cooper contends that President Bush has "expanded
the scope and character of the signing statement. " 58
In this section, we try to evaluate this claim, focusing on a
comparison between Bush's practice and Clinton's. Clinton's
signing statements provide a natural basis for comparison because Clinton was Bush's immediate predecessor and belonged
to the other party. Of course, there is no reason to think that
Bush's practice should be identical to Clinton's. They could have
good-faith disagreement about the scope of executive power. In
addition, the circumstances of the two administrations are dramatically different-with Clinton's taking place during a time of
peace and optimism, and Bush's, except for part of the first year,
occurring after the 9/11 attacks. These attacks allowed Bush to
invoke the tradition of deference to the executive during military
emergencies, and perhaps made him and his subordinates more
aggressive about asserting presidential powers vis-a-vis Congress
in his signing statements. We will return to these issues shortly.
We begin with some numbers. Although Christopher Kelley
and others have provided useful statistics regarding signing
statements, there is uncertainty about how to categorize the
statements (and Kelley has himself revised his statistics because
of this), 59 so we started from scratch and compiled our own statistics. We coded all of the statements issued from Carter
through Bush II, using the three categories of "rhetorical," "constitutional," and "interpretive." For the constitutional category,
55. See, e.g., Susan Page, How Bush Has Asserted Powers of the Executive, USA
TODAY, June 6, 2006, at 2A; The Week, The Heat Is On: July 23-29, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2006, § 4, at 2; Editorial, Read the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at A18.
56. Savage, supra note 6, at A1; see also Boston Globe, Number of New Statutes
Challenged, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/04/30/statutes_
challenged/ (providing chart, which purports to show that the first President Bush challenged 232 laws; Clinton challenged 140 laws; and Bush II challenged "at least 750"
laws).
57. Weisman, supra note 9, at A9.
58. Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 10, at 516; see also Lithwick, supra note 5
("[T]he difference between President Bush's use of the statements and that of his predecessors is a matter of frequency and kind.").
59. See And Then Spoke the ABA, http://www.users.muohio.edu/kelleycslmediablog.
html (July 24,2006, 18:00).
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we also counted all sections within a bill concerning which constitutional concerns were being raised. Finally, we computed
yearly averages for the various figures. Because the coding requires judgment, it is not surprising that our statistics differ in
some respects from those compiled by others. But the major patterns are the same, and so we are confident that our picture, in at
least rough outlines, is correct. 60 Table 1 provides the data.
Table 1

Signing Statements,
Aggregate
- rhetorical

Carter

Reagan

Bush
I

Clinton

Bush
II

225

250

228

381

132

193

121
98
21
107

311
65
12
70

25
104
27
106

- constitutional

Hi

- legislative history

16
32

164
61
29
86

39

129

169

144

844

2

4

29

12

14

56
48

31
21

57
30

48
39

25
5

4

8

24

8

20

4

4

5

2

5

8

11

27

9

20

10

16

42

18

162

1

1

9

1

2

SS's Containing Challenges,
Aggregate
Sections Challenged,
Aggregate
- SS's with challenges to an
undefined number of sections
Average SS's Per Year
- average rhetorical per
year
- average constitutional per
year
- average legislative history
Q_er_year
Average Yearly SS's with
Challenges
Average Yearly Sections
Challenged
- average yearly SS's with
challenges to an undefined number of sections

*Note: Bush's aggregate number !s through June 2006; his averages exclude 2006 because It was an mcompfete year. Rhetorical signing
60. We did not do the coding ourselves but used a law student research assistant
who was directed to apply the categories specified in the table.
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statements are purely rhetorical; no legislative or constitutional claims
are made. Unlike others before us, we classify signing statements as
"cC?nstitutio':lal'.' or "legislative. history" onlY. if. they contain legal
cla!ms .. A s1gmng stat~ment w1th both ~onst1tut10nal and legislative
cla1ms 1s counted once m row 2 and once m row 3, but only once in row
1.. We have separated out signi!lg statements that challenge an undefmed number of statutory prov1s10ns, and do not attempt to estimate
how many are in fact challenged. Numbers have been rounded.

This table does show that Bush's practice has been quantitatively unusual, but not in the simple way reported in the press. It
is important to distinguish the number of signing statements that
a president issues and the number of challenges to statutory provisions that he makes in his signing statements. In the first category, Bush does not differ much from his predecessors. In five
and one half years (ending June 30, 2006) he issued 132 signing
statements, fewer than Carter issued in four years. Bush issued
fewer signing statements on an annual basis (25) than any of his
predecessors in our table, and indeed back to President Kennedy.61
Moreover, even if one considers only signing statements
that challenge statutory provisions, Bush is on the high end but
still not outside the historical norm. His 20 signing statements
per year with constitutional challenges are substantially higher
than Clinton's (8) and Reagan's (8) but lower than G.H.W.
Bush's (25). When one includes challenges based on legislative
history, Bush's number remains at 20 while Clinton's rises to 9
and G.H.W. Bush's rises to 27.
However, Bush has clearly departed from the norm by frequently issuing challenges to numerous statutory provisions
within a single signing statement. As of June 2006, Bush had
challenged more than 800 statutory provisions, which is much
higher than any prior president. On average, Bush challenged
162 statutory provisions per year; by contrast Clinton challenged
18 and G.H.W. Bush challenged 42. A typical Bush signing
statement that is not purely rhetorical might challenge a halfdozen or more statutory provisions; other presidents would typically challenge only one or two 62 - though Clinton in some cases

61. See Kelley, supra note 15, app. 3.1 at 192 (providing support of the approximate
number of signing statements per year, on average: Ford-54; Nixon-30; Johnson-60;
Kennedy-27).
62. Compare Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 170 I (Nov. 10, 2005), with Statement on Signing the Department of
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1674 (Sept.
30, 1994).
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challenged a large number of provisions, 63 and both presidents
sometimes challenged an undefined number of provisions. 64
Before we discuss why Bush's practice might depart from
that of his predecessors, we should provide some context. Eight
hundred "provisions" sounds scary, but a statutory "provision"
challenged in a signing statement is typically just a few lines,
sometimes a bit more. Thus, in an average year during which
Bush challenges 162 provisions, one might usefully think of this
as the equivalent of about four to five pages of statutes. During
this average year, Bush will have signed about 200 laws with an
aggregate page total of around 35,000. Thus, although Bush has
challenged many more statutory provisions than his predecessors, the fraction of statutory material that he has challenged
remains trivial, less than 1/lOOOth. To be sure, some onesentence statutory provisions are of great significance, and many
others are of little importance; but this is just to say that numbers do not tell one much about whether the Bush administration's behavior has been important or not.
What accounts for the substantial increase in the frequency
of challenges within particular signing statements? It cannot be
attributed to an increase in the number of statutes or statutory
provisions, or an increase in the length of statutes, as far as we
can tell. 65 Nor does it seem likely that the 2001-2006 Congresses
enacted more constitutionally problematic legislation than the
1993-2000 Congresses. Although legislation relating to the war
on terror and war in Iraq might pose more potential conflicts
with executive authority than peacetime legislation, many of the
constitutional challenges are not related to foreign affairs, and
Congress during much of the 2001-2006 period was of the same
party as the president and thus if anything less likely to include
provisions that the president believed to be objectionable. 66
63. E.g., Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995,1 PUB. PAPERS 807 (Apr. 30, 1994).
64. See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1645 (Sept. 23, 1996); Statement on Signing the Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act, 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1389 (Nov. 12, 2001).
65. Fewer statutes were enacted annually during the Bush administration than in
prior administrations. The numbers are as follows: Carter-311; Reagan-308; G.H.W.
Bush-310; Clinton-232; G.W. Bush-211. (Westlaw Pub. Law database) (excludes
2006). The average length of statutes (in pages) for Clinton and G.W. Bush were roughly
the same, indicating that the length or complexity of statutes is not likely the source of
the difference in the frequency of challenges.
66. One can imagine explanations for why constitutional signing statements would
go up with a same-party Congress-for example, a same-party Congress might enact
bolder legislation, or might include problematic provisions for symbolic value while tac-

326

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:307

One possibility, of course, is that the Bush administration
has challenged more provisions because it has significantly
broader views of executive power than the Clinton administration. We acknowledge this possibility, but we would note that
the text of the signing statements do not by themselves provide
compelling support for it. Rather, when one compares the wording of the Bush II and Clinton signing statements, there are striking similarities.
As we noted above, Bush has objected to provisions directing the executive branch to submit proposals or recommendations to Congress on particular topics, on the ground that they
interfere with the constitutional authority of the president to
"recommend ... such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient." Clinton used the same language in a signing statement for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997:
Section 4422 of the bill purports to require the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to develop a legislative proposal
for establishing a case-mix adjusted prospective payment system for payment of long-term care hospitals under the Medicare program. I will construe this provision in light of my constitutional duty and authority to recommend to the Congress
such legislative measures as I judge necessary and expedient,

and to supervise and guide my subordinates, including the review of their proposed communications to the Congress. 67
Bush has objected to provisions that restrict the president's
ability to appoint officers or vest appointment authority in entities other than the president, on the ground that they violate the
Appointments Clause. Clinton raised an Appointments Clause
objection in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1997:
One section of the Act, Section 1002, raises a constitutional
concern. This section establishes a committee empowered to
select the entities to which certain historic lighthouses will be
conveyed. Because the committee members will hold a Federal office and because this section vests them with significant
authority, they must be appointed as officers pursuant to the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Act, however,
provides that the Secretary of Transportation "shall" appoint
four of the committee's five members from among persons
recommended or designated by certain Maine officials or oritly accepting the president's authority to ignore them-but these explanations are very
speculative.
67. Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1053,
1054 (Aug. 5, 1997) (emphasis added).
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ganizations. The Appointments Clause does not permit such
restrictions to be imposed upon the executive branch's powers
of appointment. Therefore, I will not interpret section
1002(d)(3)(A) of the Act as binding, and I direct the Secretary of Transportation to regard the designations and recom68
mendations arising from it as advisory only.

Bush has objected to provisions requiring the submission of
information to Congress, on the ground that they may interfere
with the president's authority to withhold information for various reasons, such as harm to national security. In signing a Joint
Resolution concerning U.S. policy towards Haiti, President Clinton stated:
In signing this joint resolution, it is important to clarify the interpretation of a provision related to the President's authority
and responsibility as Commander in Chief.
Section 2 of the resolution calls, inter alia, for a detailed description of "the general rules of engagement under which
operations of the United States Armed Forces are conducted
in and around Haiti." I interpret this language as seeking only
information about the rules of engagement that I may supply
consistent with my constitutional responsibilities, and not information of a sensitive operational nature. 69

Bush has objected to provisions directing the executive
branch to take particular positions in international negotiations
or before international bodies, or to report on international negotiations, on the ground that they interfere with the president's

68. Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1869, 1870 (Oct. 19, 1996); see also Statement on Signing the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,2 Pus. PAPERS 1645 (Sept. 23, 1996). We are not
claiming that the Bush and Clinton administrations had precisely the same views of the
scope of the Appointments Clause. The Clinton administration apparently viewed the
Clause as limited to persons employed to hold a federal office, see The Constitutional
Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
124, 140 (1996), whereas the Bush administration apparently has a broader view that extends the Clause to persons exercising federal power. Our claim is simply that Clinton,
like Bush, was vigorous in asserting Appointments Clause objections. See also Memorandum from Christopher Schroeder, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
to the Counsel to the President (July 1, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olc/barsh2.htm (concluding that congressional restriction on qualifications for U.S. Trade
Representative violated the Appointments Clause and could be disregarded by the
President).
69. Statement on Signing Legislation Regarding United States Policy Towards
Haiti, 2 Pus. PAPERS 1897, 1897 (Oct. 25, 1994), available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/wslindex.php?pid=49382.
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management of foreign affairs. In his signing statement for the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1997, Clinton said:
Provisions purporting to require the President to enter into or
report on specified negotiations with foreign governments, as
well as a provision that limits the information that could be
revealed in negotiations, intrude on the President's constitutional authority to conduct the Nation's diplomacy and the
in Chief. I will interpret these
President's
role as Commander
. .
70
prov1s1ons as precatory.

Bush has objected to provisions that limit the use of U.S.
armed forces, on the ground that they interfere with the president's Commander in Chief authority. Clinton raised the same
objections in his signing statement for a 1993 appropriations bill:
However, I do have serious reservations about a provision in
section 8151 of this Act. I construe section 8151(b)(2)(ii) as
not restricting my constitutional responsibility and authority
as Commander in Chief, including my ability to place U.S.
combat forces under the temporary tactical control of a foreign commander where to do otherwise would jeopardize the
safety of U.S. combat forces in support of UNOSOM II. Such
U.S. combat forces shall, however, remain under the operational command and control of U.S. commanders at all
71
times.

Bush has objected to provisions that regulate how actions
are to be taken within the executive branch, on the ground that
they interfere with the president's authority to supervise the
"unitary executive branch." By contrast with the Bush administration, Clinton never invoked the term "unitary executive" in
his signing statements. However, he did make the identical complaints, without using this term. For example, his signing statement for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 said:
Section 4422 of the bill purports to require the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to develop a legislative proposal
for establishing a case-mix adjusted prospective payment system for payment of long-term care hospitals under the Medicare program. I will construe this provision in light of my constitutional duty and authority to recommend to the Congress
70. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1645, 1646 (Sept. 23, 1996); see also Statement on Signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERT AD) Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 433
(Mar. 12, 1996).
71. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1958, 1958 (Nov. 11, 1993).
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such legislative measures as I judge necessary and expedient,
and to supervise and guide my subordinates, including the re72
view of their proposed communications to the Congress.

Similarly, in signing the Treasury and General Government Act,
President Clinton stated:
Section 640 of the bill prohibits the use of appropriations to
pay the salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Government who interferes with certain communications or contacts between other Federal employees and Members of Congress or congressional committees. I understand this provision
is intended to protect "whistleblower" employees who wish to
inform the Congress of evidence of violations of law or other
wrongdoing in the Government. Any broader interpretation
of the provision that would apply to "nonwhistleblowers"
would raise substantial constitutional concerns in depriving
the President and his department and agency heads of their
ability to supervise and control the operations and communications of the executive branch. I do not interpret this provision
to detract from my constitutional authority in this way. 73

The central tenets of the unitary executive theory are "the
president's power to remove subordinate policy-making officials
at will, the president's power to direct the manner in which subordinate officials exercise discretionary executive power, and the
president's power to veto or nullify such officials' exercises of
discretionary executive power." 74 If this definition is correct,
then it appears to us that Clinton's signing statements reflect this
theory. 7
Bush also has frequently objected to legislative veto and
approval provisions on the ground that they are inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha. 76 Clinton
did the same in a number of signing statements. 77
Finally, we should mention that Clinton, like Bush on occasion, used signing statements to advance interpretations of the
72. Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 2 PlJB. PAPERS 1053,
1054 (Aug. 5, 1997) (emphasis added).
73. Statement on Signing the Treasury and General Government Appropriations
Act,1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1339, 1340 (Oct. 10, 1997) (emphasis added).
74. Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004,90 IOWA L. REV. 601,607 (2005).
75. The theory itself is quite controversial in academia, and it is probably no coincidence that Clinton did not use the term itself.
76. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
77. E.g., Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 636 (Apr. 26, 1996).

330

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:307

legislative history unconnected to any constitutional concerns.
For example, in signing the Federal Aviation Reauthorization
Act in 1996, President Clinton stated:
I am very disappointed that the Congress included a controversial amendment of the Railway Labor Act in this legislation without the benefit of public debate or hearings. I have,
however, signed H.R. 3539 into law because the sponsors of
the amendment and the Committee of Conference have assured me that section 1223 merely restores the exact legal
standards for coverage under the Railway Labor Act as they
existed prior to the effective date of the ICC Termination Act
of 1995. Neither the amendments to the Railway Labor Act,
nor the fact that it has been amended, should be interpreted
as affecting coverage under the Railway Labor Act. 78

Clinton's and Bush's signing statements have many other
similarities. Clinton, like Bush, objected to numerous different
provisions in large bills, such as appropriations bills. 79 Both
presidents interpreted statutory language narrowly in order to
avoid constitutional problems, and in similar ways-for example,
interpreting mandatory language as precatory. 80
If Bush and Clinton rely on similar or even identical theories of executive power in their signing statements, what accounts for the difference in the frequency with which they challenge statutory provisions? One possibility is that the similar
language in their statements masks important jurisprudential difference~, which can be discovered only by consulting Office of
Legal Counsel memoranda, litigation positions, the give-andtake with Congress reflected in letters and other formal communications, and actual presidential orders. 81 This possibility is
78. Statement on Signing the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1796,1797 (Oct. 9, 1996).
79. Compare Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1843 (Oct. 23, 1998), with
Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2385 (Oct.
13, 2004).
80. Compare Statement on Signing the International Religious Freedom Act of
1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1883 (Oct. 27, 1998), with Statement on Signing th.: Maritime
Transpnrtaticm Security Act of 2002. 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2095 (Nov. 25,
2002).
81. With respect to the Bush administration, critics would likely cite to, among
other things, OLC's original torture memo and the administration's position with respect
to NSA surveillance. The degree to which the administration's position in these controversies is consistent with the views of prior administrations, and the degree to which they
are representative of the positions generally taken by the Bush administration with respect to executive power, are beyond the scope of this article.
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widely believed, but there are grounds for skepticism. The two
Office of Legal Counsel memoranda most prominently invoked
by Bush II during the current signing statements controversy
were written by Clinton's Assistant Attorney General, Walter
Dellinger. 82 In addition, Clinton's Justice Department advanced
a number of expansive interpretations of presidential powerfor example, in commenting on a bill that would have prohibited
Clinton from using appropriations to fund American troops under UN command unless he informed Congress of his intention
fifteen days in advance, the Office of Legal Counsel argued that
such a provision violates both the commander-in-chief clause
and the president's constitutional authority to conduct diplomacy.83 Until detailed comparative academic work has been
done, we think it premature to assume that Bush has issued
more challenges in his signing statements because he has significantly different views about executive power, though of course
this may turn out to be correct. For now, the point to understand
is that theories articulated in the signing statements do not themselves provide evidence that Bush and Clinton have significantly
different views about the scope of executive power.
Another possibility is that Bush uses essentially the same
constitutional theories as Clinton does, but applies them more
systematically. Perhaps the Bush administration is like a lawyer
who writes "privileged and confidential attorney work product"
on every document he prepares, even when it is extremely
unlikely that the document will ever be subject to discovery. The
Justice Department has long made it a practice of sending "bill
comments" to Congress, which object to constitutionally problematic provisions in pending bills, especially provisions that infringe on executive power. 84 The bill comment practice is routine
and bureaucratic; it is intended to prevent Congress from interpreting a president's silence about constitutionally problematic
bills as evidence that he is yielding his powers. The practice appears to have migrated to the signing statement, perhaps because
a statement issued at the signing of the bill makes clear that any
problems identified earlier were never corrected.
The 9/11 effect may also be a major explanatory variable.
Bush did not challenge any provisions on commander-in-chief
82. See supra note 20 and infra note 96.
83. See Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational
or Tactical Control, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel182 (1996).
84. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitwion in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 711-12 (2005).
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grounds prior to 9/11. 85 Since 9/11, he has issued thirty-six signing statements that include challenges on commander-in-chief
grounds, or about five per year. Moreover, national securityrelated legislation, a significant part of the statutory landscape
after 9/11, is more likely to raise issues about the scope of executive power.
Even if Bush's signing statements are qualitatively different
from Clinton's, the significance of this difference is open toquestion. Several considerations need to be addressed.
First, are the constitutional claims mostly political rhetoric
or does Bush act on them? Often, he says (like other presidents)
that he is not required to give notice to Congress about troop
deployments but will when practicable. In practice, does Bush
provide more or less notice to Congress than prior presidents
have done? A related question is whether the provisions being
challenged are important or trivial. As far we have found, the
critics of the Bush administration's use of signing statements
have not identified a single instance where the Bush administration followed through on the language in the signing statement
and refused to enforce the statute as written. Christopher May
has shown that presidents usually do not press the constitutional
claims that they make in signing statements-often because conflicts never arise in the first place (for example, Congress does
not exercise a legislative veto that the president repudiates ). 86
Second, are the claims justified or unjustified? This is an extremely difficult question. Clinton and Bush agree that the
commander-in-chief clause restricts Congress's control of military personnel. But how great is this restriction? As a matter of
constitutional theory and political morality, there is no obvious
answer. 87 Former Clinton officials argue that Bush's views about
executive power are unreasonable, whereas Clinton's were rea85. But there is a confounding factor, which is that presidents generally do not use
signing statements aggressively in their first year, perhaps because their attention is focused on the transition from the prior administration.
86. See May, supra note 15, at 937-45.
87. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("These cryptic words [of the Commander in Chief Clause] have
given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our constitutional history.").
Similarly, with respect to the unitary executive, compare Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1153 (1992), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). On the scope of presidential power generally
compare EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957:
HISTORY A:-;D ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION (4th rev. ed. 1957), with CLINTON
ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1st ed. 1956).
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sonable. 88 We accept the possibility that Clinton's views and
Bush's views, although similar in broad contours, differ in important respects, but it is hard to control for the different circumstances of their administrations. It is also much more difficult
than the Bush critics imply to argue that one president's view is
superior to the other's on normative grounds. Such an argument
depends on a theory of presidential power, which is a deeply
controversial subject.
Third, if Bush is indeed staking out broader constitutional
claims than other recent presidents, to what extent is this simply
an effort to recapture presidential authority lost in the 1970s? It
has been widely reported that Vice-President Cheney has made
a conscious effort to do this, and signing statements may be part
of this effort. 89
Finally, it is possible that other presidents have used other
instruments than Bush for achieving the same ends. Perhaps, for
example, other presidents may have used executive orders or
formal directives where Bush uses signing statements. 90 We suspect that in many cases presidents did not issue signing statements and simply refused to comply with statutory provisions
that they objected to, and Congress did not object; or if Congress
did object, presidents defended themselves by letter or else
yielded to the pressure. If the only difference between Bush and
these other presidents is that he more often stated his objections
in advance in a signing statement, then this is hardly a matter of
concern.
All of this suggests that the Bush administration critics' focus on signing statements is misguided. If critics seek to attack
the Bush administration's views about executive power, they
need to focus on other documents such as Office of Legal Counsel memoranda, and examine the administration's actions as well
as its words. Presidents before Bush have staked out strong positions on executive privilege, immunity of the president to criminal indictment, and related issues; all of these positions, and actions based on them, need to be considered as well as signing

88. See, e.g., Symposium, War, Terrorism and Torture: Limits on Presidential Power
in the 21st Centurty, 81 IND. L.J. 1139 (2006). But cf JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER
MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR ch. 7 (2006) (arguing that
Clinton's and Bush's views of the commander-in-chief power are the same).
89. See John Yoo, Editorial, How the Presidency Regained its Balance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2006, § 4, at 15.
90. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 14, at 2285-99 (documenting Clinton Administration's frequent use of orders and directives).
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statements. If the critics believe that the signing statement itself
is constitutionally problematic, then they should not focus on
Bush. They should complain about the signing statement practices of Clinton, Reagan, Truman, FDR, and even James Monroe. But we will not let this inconsistency prevent us from inquiring into the legal and normative basis of the signing statement
critique, the subject of Parts III and IV.
III. LEGAL CRITIQUES OF SIGNING STATEMENTS
Critics have questioned the legality of presidential signing
statements when they are used for purposes other than political
rhetoric. In this Part, we consider the principal legal arguments
that have been made against signing statements. As we explain,
most of the legal arguments boil down to either disagreement
with the perceived substantive claims being made in the statements or a concern about judicial deference to the claims and
therefore do not provide a basis for concluding that the statements themselves are legally problematic. In this Part, we address the legal issues. Many critics also suggest that the phenomenon of signing statements has negative institutional
effects-for example, on the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches-without necessarily suggesting
that these negative effects result in illegality. We address these
institutional arguments separately in Part IV.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNING STATEMENTS

Critics have raised several legal objections to constitutional
signing statements-that is, statements in which the president
raises constitutional concerns about bills that the president has
signed. Before considering these objections, we need to highlight
a preliminary issue that relates to these objections. The issue is
whether the president has a constitutional duty to enforce laws
that he believes are unconstitutional.
Commentators are divided over this issue. 91 Some commentators argue that presidents must always enforce a statute, regardless of whether they believe it to be constitutional, unless
and until courts hold that the statute is unconstitutional. 92 Other
91. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 14--22 (Winter/Spring 2000) (describing
the debate).
92. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381
(1986); May, supra note 15; ArthurS. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the
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commentators argue that in the absence of a judicial resolution
of the issue, presidents have no obligation to enforce a statute
that they believe to be unconstitutional- and, indeed, may have
an obligation not to enforce the statute. 93 Still other commentators argue for an intermediate position whereby presidents may
sometimes disregard statutes that they believe to be unconstitutional, such as when a statute violates a Supreme Court precedent or invades executive power. 94 There is also a related debate
over the extent to which presidents should presume statutes to
be constitutional. 95
Perhaps not surprisingly, presidents have often claimed the
authority to disregard statutes that they believe to be unconstitutional. As Walter Dellinger has noted, executive branch
"[ o]pinions dating to at least 1860 assert the President's authority to decline to effectuate enactments that the President views
as unconstitutional." 96 Even before that, there are examples of
presidents declining to enforce statutes because of constitutional
concerns-for example, Jefferson declined to continue prosecutions under the Sedition Act because of First Amendment concerns.97 In the modern era, both Republican and Democratic
presidents have claimed that they are not bound by provisions in
the War Powers Resolution because these provisions unconstitutionally infringe on the commander-in-chief clause or-what is
the same thing-have interpreted the Resolution narrowly so as
not to constrain them. 98 Another, less controversial example is
Laws, 40 V AND. L. REV. 389, 395-98 (1987).
93. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
905 (1990); John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333 (1998); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO.
L.J. 217 (1994); see also David Barron et al., Untangling the Debate on Signing Statements, http:/ /gulcfac. typepad.com/georgetown_ university_law/2006/07/thanks_to_the_p.
html (July 31, 2006).
94. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 91.
95. See, e.g., id.. at 35 (arguing for presumption of constitutionality).
96. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President para. 3 (Nov.
2, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oldnonexcut.htm.
97. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 57, 58 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) ("I affirm
that act to be no law, because in opposition to the constitution; and I shall treat it as a
nullity, wherever it comes in the way of my functions.").
98. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETI, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE CRS-2 (Nov. 15, 2004) ("(S)ince the War
Powers Resolution's enactment, over President Nixon's veto in 1973, every President has
taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement by the Congress on the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief."), available at http://www.fas.
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the frequent statement by presidents that they are not bound by
one-house or legislative committee veto provisions, in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha. 9 On several occasions
in different administrations, the Attorney General or the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel has expressed the view
that ~residents may decline to enforce unconstitutional statutes.1 ° Equally unsurprisingly, Congress has sometimes contested the proposition that the president may refuse to enforce
statutes that he views as unconstitutional. Indeed, the asserted
basis for impeaching (and almost convicting) President Andrew
Johnson was his refusal, on constitutional grounds, to comply
with the Tenure of Office Act, which was enacted over his
veto. 101
The Supreme Court has not definitively addressed this issue, although some of its decisions and statements could be read
as providing modest support for a presidential power to disregard at least some unconstitutional statutes. Justice Jackson's
celebrated concurrence in Youngstown assumes that under some
circumstances courts will uphold presidential actions "incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con~ress," although
such actions will be "scrutinized with caution." 02 In Myers v.
United States, the Court agreed with the President that a statute
that required Senate approval for removal of the postmaster was
unconstitutional, and the Court did not comment negatively on

org!man!crs/IB81050.pdf; Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into
Bosnia, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel327 (Nov. 30, 1995) ("The Executive Branch has traditionally taken the position that the President's power to deploy armed forces into situations of actual or indicated hostilities is not restricted to the three categories specifically
marked out by the Resolution.").
99. Even before Chadha, a number of presidents had expressed the view that they
were not bound by legislative veto provisions. See Paulsen, supra note 93, at 267.
100. See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note 96; Issues Raised by
Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 18 (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oldgray.11.htm; Issues Raised by
Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 37 (1990); Constitutionality of Congress' Disapproval of Agency Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to
the President, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 21 (1980) (opinion on Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti).
101. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 226-27 (1992).
102. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The much-discussed footnote 23 in the recent Hamdan decision is
not inconsistent with this proposition: it states that the president may not disregard limitations enacted by Congress "in proper exercise of its own war powers," suggesting that
the president may be able to disregard limitations imposed by Congress that exceed its
war powers. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006).
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the President's refusal to comply with that statute. 103 And four
Justices in Freytag v. Commissioner stated in passing that the
president has the power "to disregard [laws encroaching on his
authority] when they are unconstitutional." 104
We take no position on this issue because it is orthogonal to
the legality of constitutional signing statements. If it is proper for
presidents to at least sometimes refuse to enforce statutes that
they think are unconstitutional, then announcing such an intention in a signing statement cannot be illegal, and indeed it may
be desirable to have the president state his intention in this regard at the earliest possible moment so that Congress and potential litigants can take it into account. 105 Of course, presidents will
sometimes make invalid assertions of unconstitutionality, and
they may have an incentive to take aggressive positions with respect to presidential power in particular. This simply means,
however, that the substantive views expressed in signing statements will sometimes be legally problematic, not that the phenomenon of signing statements is itself legally problematic. On
the other hand, if one believes that presidents should never decline to enforce statutes based on an assertion of unconstitutionality, then one will also believe that they should not issue signing
statements claiming this authority. But the problem here will be
the underlying views expressed in the statements, not the state103. 272 u.s. 52 (1926).
104. 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Two circuit courts (one in a withdrawn opinion and the other in dicta) have
expressed the view that the president has a duty to enforce statutes that he believes to be
unconstitutional. See Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 809 F.2d 979 (3d
Cir. 1986); Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part, 893
F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989).
105. Congress has enacted a statute providing that:
The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in
which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice ... establishes or implements a formal or informal policy to refrain ... from enforcing, applying, or administering any provision of any Federal statute ... whose
enforcement, application, or administration is within the responsibility of the
Attorney General or such officer on the grounds that such provision is unconstitutional ....
28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(l) (2006). Such a report must be made within 30 days after the policy is implemented, and must "include a complete and detailed statement of the relevant
issues and background (including a complete and detailed statement of the reasons for
the policy or determination ... )." /d. § 530D(c)(2). In signing the latest version of this
statute, President Bush stated that "[t]he executive branch shall construe [this section
and related provisions] in a manner consistent with the constitutional authorities of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties."
Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1971, 1971 (November 2, 2002).
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ments themselves. 106 Moreover, even if presidents accepted the
view that they had to enforce all statutes, constitutional signing
statements could still play a useful informational role- for example, presidents could use them to state that they were enforcing a statute under protest, and perhaps also to direct executive
branch lawyers not to defend the constitutionality of the statute
in litigation.
With these points in mind, we now consider the legal objections to constitutional signing statements. One argument is that
these statements constitute an abuse of the veto process set forth
in the Constitution. 107 The Presentment Clause of the Constitution provides that bills that are approved by the House and Senate shall be presented to the president and that, if he approves
the bill "he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to the House in which it shall have originated." 108 If the
president returns a bill, Congress then has the constitutional authority to enact the bill into law over the president's objection
upon a two-thirds vote in both Houses. 109 The president improperly circumvents this process, the argument goes, if he signs a bill
and then states in a signing statement that he has constitutional
objections to it. In that situation, unlike with a veto, the bill is
not returned to Congress to give it an opportunity to enact the
bill into law over the president's objection.
This argument is unpersuasive, for several reasons. First, in
the signing statement, the president is not purporting to use his
presidential authority to block enactment of the law, which is
what happens with a veto. Instead, he is claiming that the Constitution itself blocks the law from taking effect. He may or may
not be right about such a claim, but his position is different from
when he exercises a veto. For example, unlike with a veto, the
president cannot validly use a signing statement to announce
that he will not enforce a statute merely because he disagrees
with it as a matter of policy.
Second, the effect of the signing statement is also different
from that of a veto. Among other things, the statute remains on
the books, available for application by courts (if they find it to be
106. Some critics are concerned that signing statements will make it easier for presidents to assert non-enforcement authority. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 10. No one has
explained why this might be so, however.
107. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 18-19; May, supra note 15; Bruce
Fein, Commentary, Great Usurpations, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at A15.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2.
109.

/d.
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constitutional) or by a subsequent president with different constitutional views. By contrast, a bill that is vetoed never becomes
law, for either the courts or the executive, unless and until it is
reenacted by a supermajority of Congress.
Third, it is unlikely that a constitutional signing statement
changes the outcome that would result if the bill were instead returned to Congress and then reenacted over the president's veto.
In either case, if the president believes that he should not execute unconstitutional laws, then he will not do so.
Finally, the president and his subordinates can uncontroversially announce their views about the constitutionality of a statute in other contexts-in internal communications within the executive branch, for example. Indeed, the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel does this routinely. It is difficult to see
why it suddenly becomes legally problematic for the president to
state such views in a signing statement.
A related argument is that constitutional signing statements
constitute improper "line-item" vetoes. 110 The Supreme Court
has held that a line-item veto, whereby a president cancels or alters legislation after it is enacted, is unconstitutional even if approved in advance by Congress. 111 When he states in a signing
statement that he will not give effect to a statutory provision because he believes it to be unconstitutional, the argument goes, he
is in effect exercising a line-item veto. Indeed, unless his objection relates to the entire bill in all of its applications, which is
unlikely, then the president can be seen as accepting the portions
of the legislation that he approves and canceling those portions
that he disapproves, or "cherry-picking" the legislation, which is
exactly what would happen with a line-item veto.
This argument is also unpersuasive, for essentially the same
reasons why the veto abuse argument is weak. When the president issues a constitutional signing statement, he is not purporting to use any executive authority to cancel all or part of a statute. He is making a claim about the effect of the Constitution on

110. See, e.g. Time Change, supra note 41 (statement of Bruce Fein, Partner, Fein &
Fein); COOPER, supra note 16, at 203--D6 (describing certain uses of signing statements as
fiscal and substantive line-item vetoes); Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 10, at 531
(asserting that signing statements "can and have been used as line-item vetoes of legislation presented to the president for signature or veto but without the use of the formal
veto or the opportunity for legislative override processes"); see also Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir. 1988), wilhdrawn in part, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989);
ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 18.
111. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417,421 (1998).
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the legal effect of the statute. He may also be signaling his unwillingness to enforce a statutory provision that he believes is
unconstitutional in the absence a judicial resolution of the matter, something that he could do outside the context of a signing
statement. If it is improper for him to decline to enforce a statute
in that situation (an issue on which, as discussed above, we take
no position), then it will be improper regardless of the signing
statement. Conversely, if this is a proper course of action, it is
hard to see how making that intention clear in a signing statement renders it illegal; indeed, one might think that generally it
is better for the president to make clear his views in this regard
so that Congress can react if it so wishes. 112
Moreover, whether a president's refusal to enforce a statute
will have the effect of preventing a provision from being enforced will depend on a variety of factors, including the availability of judicial review. If judicial review is available, courts will
make their own assessment of the president's constitutional argument, and they are unlikely to give substantial deference to
the president's views of the Constitution. If they nevertheless
agree with the president's argument, then it will be the judges'
construction of the Constitution, not the political authority of
the president, that nullifies the provision, and the courts can also
make a judgment about whether the provision is severable from
the rest of the legislation. In the absence of judicial review, the
matter will be resolved, like most separation of powers issues,
through the political process. It is not clear that the mere fact of
the signing statement will affect how that process comes out, and
certainly critics have not presented any empirical evidence showing such an effect.
A different (and better) version of the veto abuse argument
and the line-item veto argument is the claim that the president
has a constitutional duty to veto statutes he believes to be unconstitutional. The argument here is that the president's oath of
office and the Take Care Clause require him to enforce the Constitution, and that he violates this duty if he si?ns into law a statute that he believes to be unconstitutional. 11 Under this argu-

112. To be sure, not all signing statements are clear. Some of them are vague, and we
are not claiming that Bush or any other president has used signing statements in some
sort of ideal way. Even the vague ones, however, provide more information than silence
would. Moreover, vagueness may also reduce the effect of a signing statement on the actions of executive branch subordinates in implementing a statute, something critics arc
concerned about.
113. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 19.
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ment, it may be proper for a president to decline to enforce a
statutory provision that he believes to be unconstitutional if it
was signed into law by a predecessor or enacted over his veto, or
if he discovers the constitutional problem only after enactment,
but he should never sign a bill into law if he believes at that time
that it has an unconstitutional provision. This argument has
some formal appeal, although it is subject to the counterargument that the president's act of signing does not give the provision legal effect, since an unconstitutional law has no legal effect.
As a result, as long as he makes clear that he is not sanctioning
the unconstitutional provision, the president is not violating his
oath to uphold the Constitution merely by the act of signing;
rather, he would violate his oath only if he enforced the unconstitutional provision. Signing and enforcement, in other words,
may not be formally comparable. 114 To be sure, if a president believed that all or most of bill was unconstitutional, the argument
for some sort of duty to avoid sanctioning the bill through signature would be stronger, although this scenario rarely comes up.
In any event, we believe that the argument that a president must
always veto a bill if it has what he believes to be an unconstitutional provision is unrealistic in an age of omnibus legislation:
presidents are often presented with dozens and even hundreds of
provisions in a bill, often on multiple subjects, and as a political
matter they will not be able to veto such bills simply because of
constitutional concerns about a particular provision. 115 The argument is particularly unrealistic once it is remembered that the
asserted unconstitutionaliW often relates merely to possible applications of the provision. 16
Critics also have challenged the invocation of constitutional
concerns in signing statements to justify particular statutory interpretations. When presidents have constitutional concerns, it is
rare for them to announce in a signing statement that they will
decline to enforce a statutory provision. Instead, they frequently
114. Some people have argued that if the president can sign laws with provisions that
he believes unconstitutional despite his oath, then Congress would be able to enact laws
it believes unconstitutional despite the members' oaths. It is not clear that this would be a
problem-Congress could simply expect the president and courts to refuse to give legal
effect to laws found to be unconstitutional- but in any event the president has a better
argument that he respects his oath by refusing to enforce unconstitutional provisions,
whereas Congress has no such instrument for depriving its enactments of effect.
115. On the rise of omnibus legislation, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE
GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2[){)2, 70--80 (2d
ed. 2005). It may be that some phenomenon (such as decentralization in Congress) has
contributed both to the rise of omnibus legislation and the rise of signing statements.
116. See Barron et al., supra note 93.
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state that they will interpret the provision in a way that will
avoid the purported constitutional problem. With respect to the
ban on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees contained in the Detainee Treatment Act, for example, President
Bush stated that the executive branch would construe the ban
"in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as
Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional
limitations on the judicial power. " 117 Critics contend that this
practice allows presidents to distort the meaning of statutes and
thereby in effect disregard or change them.
In considering this objection, it is useful to distinguish between situations in which a statute is truly ambiguous, and situations in which the president is purporting to interpret a statute
when in fact his interpretation is contrary to its plain meaning.
When a statute is truly ambiguous, it is difficult to see how it is
legally objectionable for a president to adopt an interpretation
that avoids constitutional concerns. 118 The Supreme Court regularly applies such a constitutional avoidance canon when it construes statutes. 119 One might object that merely invoking constitutional "concerns" allows the president to disregard a greater
number of statutory provisions than if he had to take a firm position on its constitutionality. This problem has been noted with
respect to judicial reliance on the constitutional avoidance
canon. The objections to that canon as used by the courts, however, are less applicable to the president. Critics have noted that
judicial underenforcement of statutes based on constitutional
concerns will often be contrary to what Congress would have

117. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in The Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic InOucnza
Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005).
118. For such a claim, however, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and the
Avoidance Canon, 81 INDIANA L.J. 1313, 1316 (2006). Powell contends that the judicial
avoidance canon limits the judiciary's authority whereas the executive's use of the avoid·
ance canon enhances the executive's authority. A problem with this argument is that it
assumes particular baselines. Powell assumes that if a court did not use the canon it
would have to strike down statutes, whereas if the executive did not use the canon it
would have to enforce the statute. But we could switch baselines and start with the as·
sumption that without such a canon the judiciary would strike down only clearly invalid
statutes and that without such a canon the executive would refuse to obey ambiguously
invalid statutes. For additional discussion of the usc of the avoidance canon by the execu·
tive branch, see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitwional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006).
119. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555-56 (2002); Communications
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,762 (1988).
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wanted. 120 Unlike the courts, however, the president is a participant in the enactment of legislation, as well as the actor responsible for enforcement of the legislation, so he has a stronger
claim than the courts to decide on underenforcement. Indeed,
outside the context of signing statements, the executive branch
in a host of situations uncontroversially decides on the level of
121
. .
enforcement o f statutory proviSions.
Moreover, for many of the constitutional interpretive
statements, it is not clear that there will even be underenforcement. Many of the statements appear simply to be placeholders
to preserve an executive viewpoint about the Constitution, not
an indication that the executive will decline to fully enforce a
statute. 122 Indeed, some of them specifically note that, despite
the alleged constitutional problems, the executive will enforce
the statute "as a matter of comity." 123 And many statements,
perhaps most, address contingencies that might never arise. For
example, when the president invokes the commander-in-chief
clause in order to justify interpreting a statutory reporting obligation so that it does not interfere with national security, he does
not thereby announce that he will ignore the law, because the
reporting requirement may never conflict with national security.
Similarly, the controversial statement for the Detainee Treatment Act does not assert that that the President will ignore the
law. Even in situations in which he believes that he has the constitutional authority to disregard the Act, he (or his subordinates) might nevertheless comply with it for policy reasons. 124 As
120. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71.
121. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (finding that agency decisions
not to exercise enforcement authority are presumptively not subject to judicial review);
Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1283-84 (2002) (discussing
the limited constraints on prosecutorial discretion).
122. See Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 41 (statement of Michelle E.
Boardman) ("Many constitutional signing statements arc an attempt to preserve the enduring balance between co-equal branches, but this preservation does not mean that the
President will not enforce the provision as enacted."); Savage, supra note 6, at A1
("Nothing in the world changes by the publication of a signing statement. The statements
merely serve as public notice about how the administration is interpreting the law."
(quoting Jack Goldsmith, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel)).
123. E.g., Statement on Signing Legislation to Address the Participation of Taiwan
in the World Health Organization, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1070 (Jun. 14, 2004);
Statement on Signing the Strengthen AmcriCorps Program Act, 39 WEEKLy COMP.
PRES. Doc. 876 (July 3, 2(XJ3); Statement on Signing Legislation Concerning Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 679
(May 29, 2003).
124. According to news reports, after the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act,
the Central Intelligence Agency largely halted its overseas interrogation program for
high-level terrorist suspects. See Guy Dinmore, CIA Forced Bush Hand on Secret Pris-
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a result, it is not clear that a higher number of constitutional
signing statements correlates with increased presidential noncompliance with statutes. Richard Epstein has argued that signing statements could be the "opening wedge to a presidential
posture that judicial decisions may limit the president's ability to
use courts to enforce his policies, but cannot stop him from acting unilaterally." 125 But Epstein cites no evidence that Bush, who
has been in office for more than five years, has begun acting unilaterally in a way that is contrary to judicial decisions, and Bush's
decision to comply with decisions like Hamdan suggest the contrary. Applying an "opening wedge" argument to Bush is also
odd; such an argument would have been more appropriately applied to Reagan or to an even earlier president who used signing
statements, and yet the general growth of executive power aside,
no one thinks that earlier signing statements have enabled presidents to ignore judicial decisions.
B. INTERPRETIVE SIGNING STATEMENTS

Interpretive (or legislative history) signing statements also
have generated controversy. Critics contend that, if courts give
weight to these interpretive statements, it will undermine separation of powers. 126 Giving weight to these statements, the argument goes, will in effect allow the president to legislate without
following the process for legislation set forth in Article I of the
Constitution. Relatedly, critics suggest that if courts give weight
to signing statements, the president will in effect have the ability
to exercise a veto over legislation without being subject to having the veto overridden as provided for in Article I, or will in effect be exercising a line-item veto. 127 Alternatively, critics contend that if courts give weight to interpretive signing statements
they will be improperly abdicating their authority to interpret
the law. 128 Consequently, the critics argue, signing statements
"should be given no weight by a court when interpreting the in129
tent of Congress. "
There are a number of problems with this argument. As an
initial matter, it is important to note that the argument is not an
ons, FINAI'CIAL TIMES, Sept. 21,2006, at 1.
125. Epstein, supra note 10.
126. See, e.g., Garber & Wimmer, supra note 1; William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of
Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991).
127. Garber & Wimmer, supra note 1, at 375-76.
128. /d. at 384--85.
129. /d. at 368.
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objection to signing statements per se. Rather, the objection is to
the possibility that courts will give weight to such statements
when interpreting statutes. It is not clear at this point, however,
whether and to what extent courts will give weight to these
statements. 130 Nor have presidents claimed that the signing
statements are controlling on the courts. 131 In addition, the argument fails to distinguish between various degrees of weight
that courts might give to signing statements. We are not aware of
anyone who argues that these statements should be dispositive
or should trump clear statutory language. The real issue, therefore, is whether they should be given some weight when statutory meaning is otherwise ambiguous, in the same way that
courts often give weight to pre-enactment statements by members of Congress or congressional committees. If one concludes
that signing statements are a relevant piece of evidence concerning statutory meaning, then relying on such statements would
not amount to a veto or alteration of the legislation.
Moreover, the proposition that it violates separation of
powers for courts to give any weight to statutory interpretations
by the executive that are announced after a bill is signed into law
is in tension with modern administrative law. Courts routinely
give deference to post-enactment statutory interpretations by
executive branch agencies- under the Chevron and Skidmore
doctrines, for example. Courts give this sort of deference to executive agencies because of their expertise and because Congress
often expects that agencies will fill in gaps and ambiguities in enactments. Moreover, courts reason that if Congress disagrees
130. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), the Supreme Court majority did
not even mention, let alone give weight to, the President's interpretation of the Detainee
Treatment Act in his signing statement, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent. See id.
at 2816 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A survey of judicial opinions with the phrase "signing
statement" in them suggests that courts cite them to bolster an interpretation of Congress's intent for which there is other evidence in the legislative history but do not give
them much, if any, independent weight. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.l
(1986) (noting without comment that President's signing statement expressed view that
act is unconstitutional); United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that Clinton statement is consistent with conference report); United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 443 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2002) (same); Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d
466, 488(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Eisenhower signing statement and other legislative history
to show that pledge statute was meant to be coercive); Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081,
1087 n.4 (9th Cir.1999) (citing signing statement for meaning of statute in dicta); United
States v. Story, 891 F.2d 988, 994(2d Cir. 1989) (using a Reagan signing statement, among
other factors, to resolve contlicting interpretations in the House and Senate legislative
history); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1181 n.38 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting
that signing statement is consistent with House report).
131. See Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 41 (statement of Michelle E.
Boardman) ("Signing statements, of course, are not binding on the courts .... ").
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with the agency's interpretation, it has the ability to override the
interpretation through new legislation. These justifications will
likely apply to at least some interpretive signing statements. 132
In addition, critics of signing statements do not contend that
it violates separation of powers for courts to give weight to congressional materials when interpreting statutes. 133 Instead, they
argue that signing statements should not be considered because
these statements, unlike congressional materials, do not help reveal the intent of members of Congress. 134 It is not clear from the
text or structure of the Constitution, however, why the views of
the president are not relevant to the interpretation of legislation.
Article I provides that, absent a supermajority, Congress cannot
enact legislation without the signature of the president. In light
of the difficulty of overriding a presidential veto, this means that
for most legislation the president is a necessary partner with
Congress in the enactment process. Since legislation reflects an
agreement between Congress and the president, the president's
views about the agreement would seem to be as relevant as Congress's views. 135
To be sure, at the signing statement stage, the president may
have more ability to engage in cheap talk than a legislator commenting on a bill, because signing statements occur after enactment and thus after Congress can revise the bill in reaction to
the statement. A better argument against giving weight to inter-

132. See Cross, supra note 1. Some scholars argue that interpretive authority is
granted to the relevant agency, not to the president. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Presidenr's Stallltory Pov;ers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006). Even if
this is correct, the agency head surely benefits from knowing the president's views as his
job might depend on them, and agencies undoubtedly receive and respond to direction
from the president.
133. Some commentators and judges do argue that it is improper to look at legislative history when interpreting a statute. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-30 (1997). Presumably these
commentators and judges would also disapprove of looking at presidential signing statements when interpreting a statute. See, e.g., Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 41
(statement of Prof. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Georgetown Law Center) (arguing that
"the project of statutory interpretation is to discern 'the original meaning of the text, not
what the original draftsmen intended,"' and that "presidential signing statements-like
legislative history-are of very little usc in that project").
134. Garber & Wimmer, supra note 1, at 370,392.
135. See Cross, supra note 1, at 218 ("[S]o long as the President influences legislation, there is persuasive reason for courts to consider the text of presidential signing
statements."); see also WILLIA~1 N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH
GARRETT, CASES A;-.iD MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUES AND THE CREATION OF
PCBLIC POLICY 996 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that, "for the same reasons that interpreters
are usuallv interested in the views of the congressional sponsors, they might be interested
in the vie~s of the President, who effectively sponsors much major legislation").
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pretive signing statements, therefore, is that they are unreliable
indicators of presidential understandings of statutory meaning,
and that they should be given no more weight than postenactment statements by members of Congress, which the Supreme Court has said provide "an extremely hazardous basis for
inferring the meaning of a congressional enactment." 136 We address this argument below in Part IV in comparing signing
statements with pre-enactment legislative history.
If courts do not give weight to interpretive signing statements, it is difficult to see how they could be legally objectionable. By necessity, the executive branch must interpret statutes
in order to implement and enforce them. 137 The president must
also interpret statutes in order to supervise the executive branch.
If the president did not issue signing statements, he would simply
use other vehicles for statutory interpretations, and those other
vehicles would be less contemporaneous with the enactment of
the legislation and often less public. Critics of executive power,
however, usually favor greater transparency.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In this part, we consider signing statements from an institutional perspective. Should presidents be criticized for and discouraged from using signing statements? To answer this question, one must identify the damage that signing statements do to
the constitutional system. One might show, for example, that legislative outcomes in a world without signing statements would be
better than legislative outcomes in the world that we have. Unfortunately, given scholars' limited understanding of how
American political institutions work, and the existence of serious
controversies about how they should work, we cannot do more
than provide a sketch of what a defense of signing statements
would look like. But we think that this sketch should be enough
to throw the burden back on the critics, who also need to overcome the presumption in favor of signing statements given the
lawfulness of signing statements and their historical pedigree.

136. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 &
n.l3 (1980); see also, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 135, at 996 (noting "problems of reliability" with signing statements).
137. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) ("Interpreting a law enacted by
Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the
law."); Easterbrook, supra note 93.
-
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We will start with some basic assumptions that we take from
the most sophisticated work on legislative institutions and statutory interpretation, the literature on positive political theory
(PPT). It turns out that many authors writing in this literature
disapprove of signing statements, so we will take their argument
as our foil. After describing the general approach of the literature to statutory interpretation, we will discuss the critics' argument. We then show that this argument is sustainable only on
narrow and implausible or controversial assumptions. PPT, in
fact, shows that signing statements do not raise distinctive problems in comparison with other legislative and executive documents.
A. BACKGROUND
The PPT literature treats statutes as the outcome of bargains among various political actors who comprise the "enacting
coalition." The enacting coalition consists of those parties whose
approval was necessary for the enactment of the statute. Who
belongs to the enacting coalition depends heavily on context, but
roughly one can say that the coalition excludes people who vote
against the bill and the extreme supporters whose preferences
were not shared by those whose votes were necessary to create a
majority. The coalition will also usually include committees
whose approval is needed for a vote on the floor, the median
voter in each house, and the gresident, unless he vetoed the bill
and his veto was overridden. 1
The members of the enacting coalition play the role that
contract parties do in the economic analysis of contract law. In
the contracts literature, scholars assume that the contracting parties seek to make an agreement that maximizes the value of the
relationship. A hypothetical, complete contract would assign
rights and obligations for every possible contingency in a manner
that maximizes value. Because of transaction or bargaining costs,
however, the parties must leave "gaps" in the contract. The role
of the court is to fill these gaps in a manner that maximizes the
ex ante value of the contract-or, what is usually the same thing,
that provides the parties what they would have bargained for if
138. We are simplifying; for the full story, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use
of Positive Political Theory in Stawtory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 21
(Winter/Spring 1994); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 722-25 (1992). (McNollgast is the collective
name used by Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast when writing together.)
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they had anticipated, and bargained over, the contingency. One
can similarly view legislation as having gaps because members of
the enacting coalition cannot anticipate and bargain over all possible contingencies that affect the value of the legislative deal. If
the analogy to contract law is right, then courts should fill the
legislative gaps with the terms of a similar hypothetical bargain- the terms that the parties would have chosen because they
maximize the value of the legislative deal. 139
There are important differences between the contractual
and legislative settings. One can more reasonably assume that a
deal that receives the consent of both contracting parties enhances their welfare and, externalities aside, therefore social
welfare as well, than that a legislative deal that receives the consent of members of the enacting coalition-a majority or perhaps supermajority of a group who very imperfectly represent
the interests of the public-maximizes social welfare. Nonetheless, the assumption that courts should fill legislative gaps with
terms that the enacting coalition would have wanted rests on two
plausible considerations. First, our political system is built on the
assumption that Congress makes good law-or, at least, that new
law is generally superior to the status quo. Courts do not have
the authority to reject this assumption. Second, if courts did not
enforce legislative intent when gaps exist, then Congress would
respond by passing new, more detailed laws. The additional bargaining and drafting costs would produce no offsetting benefits.140
McNollgast and other authors argue that the enacting coalition's intention-a compromise of everyone's most preferred
version of the law-should be considered the meaning of the
statute. However, the statements of the members of the enacting
coalition during the legislative process do not necessarily reveal
the coalition's intention. The problem is that often a member
lacks an incentive to disclose the compromise meaning of the
bill. A person who preferred a more extreme or moderate version of the bill would like courts to interpret the compromise
language in the more extreme or moderate way. If the courts
rely on legislative history, that person has an incentive to insert
statements in the legislative history with his preferred meaning.
139. See McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 138, at 708-15.
140. On the other hand, if courts cannot reliably determine legislative intent, then
they should refuse to fill gaps, thus encouraging Congress to write more detailed statutes.
See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006).
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McNol\sast argues that these statements should be given no
weight. 1
By contrast, some statements are credible, or at least more
credible, because the speaker would incur a cost if he said something else. For example, if a committee report interprets compromise language in an extreme fashion, then the majority will
vote down the bill. If the committee prefers the compromise language to no bill at all (the status quo), it would do better toreport the accurate interpretation than the extreme interpretation.142 Therefore, the committee report's statement is (usually)
143
credible. Similarly, language in an amendment that is voted
down by the majority on the floor provides a clue, by way of
negative inference, of the meaning of the bill. Here the majority's vote is the credible statement; if the majority voted in favor
of the amendment, it would be worse off on the assumption that
it prefers the unamended version of the bill. 144
In sum, when using legislative history, courts should focus
(1) on the statements of members of the enacting coalition, (2)
when those statements are credible because the member has an
incentive to speak truthfully or at least partially truthfully.
B. SIGNING STATEMENTS

How do these considerations bear on presidential signing
statements? Initially, to keep the discussion simple, we will limit
our focns to signing statements that provide an interpretation of
the statute based on nonconstitutional considerations. Further,
we will assume that a court will give weight to the signing statement in future litigation. We will relax these assumptions in Section C.
The first criterion is that the president be part of the enacting coalition. As McNollgast acknowledges, the president will
almost always be a member of the enacting coalition because he
has the veto. Because Congress must craft the bill in such a way
as to avoid the veto, the bill will almost always reflect the president's preference-except when the veto is overridden, in which
case no signing statement will be issued. 145 To be sure, there are
141. McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 138, at 737.
142. !d. at 722-24.
143. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 138, at 27-28.
144. /d. at 26.
145. For an exhaustive analysis and empirical evidence, see CHARLES M. CAMERON,
VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGATIVE POWER (2000); see
also GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002);
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some circumstances where technically the president's preference
does not affect the content of the bill. For example, if the president seeks a moderate bill that slightly changes the status quo,
the relevant players in Congress seek a more extreme bill, but
the president also prefers the extreme bill to the status quo, then
Congress's preferences will determine the content of the bill; the
president's is irrelevant. 146 But as McNollgast acknowledges,
these sorts of situations are more hypothetical than real; the
president's influence is pervasive. The veto power is significant;
also the president can sometimes set the agenda by proposing
legislation and using his political and institutional resources (including his leadership of one of the political parties in Congress)
to focus Congress's attention on his proposal. Therefore, it
seems appropriate to assume that the president is always a
member of the enacting coalition except when his veto is overridden.
The second criterion is that the president's signing statement be credible. McNollgast argues that it will not be credible
because it occurs after Congress has voted. Congress does not
have the opportunity to reject the president's statement; therefore, the president will state his preferred interpretation rather
than the actual compromise interpretation. 147 One might argue
that the president's signing statement is in this way no different
from the statements made by individual members of Congress
who do not hold committee or other leadership positions, or indeed from the statements made by members of Congress after
the bill has been passed and signed. 148
To understand this argument, consider the following example. Suppose a liberal president supports a bill that prohibits certain emissions of a certain quantity but would strongly prefer a
bill that bans these emissions altogether. The bill is ambiguous in
Steven A. Matthews, Vew Threals: Rhewric in a Bargaining Game, 104 Q. J. ECO'.'. 347
(1989).
146. McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 138, at 722-23.
147. McNollgast, Legis/alive Intent, supra note 138, at 28; McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 138, at 726-27; McNollgast, Commentary, The Theory of Interpretive
Canon and Legislative Behavior, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 235, 237 (1992) (repeating
this conclusion but also seeming tJ qualify it); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the
I964 Civil Rights Act and Its Imerpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1446 & n.91 (2003);
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statwory Interpretation and Political Advamage, 12 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 217, 227-28 (1992) (expressing skepticism about the value of signing statements).
148. However, this type of material is sometimes used by courts. See ESKRIDGE,
FRICKEY & GARRETT, mpra note 135, at 1018.
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part because of different views within the enacting coalition,
most of whose members prefer the more conservative version of
the bill and would not vote in favor of the liberal interpretation.
Thus, the "intention" of the enacting coalition is the conservative interpretation-the emissions are limited, not eliminated.
The president stays quiet during legislative deliberations while
members of Congress advance the conservative interpretation of
the bill. The bill passes with a bare majority in each house. In the
signing statement, the president for the first time advances the
liberal version of the bill. If he expressed this view prior to the
final vote, and courts would accept this view, the bill would not
have received a majority because a majority would not vote for a
bill that would be given the president's interpretation by courts
in subsequent litigation.
Thus, if courts gave weight to the president's signing statement, it would thwart the will of the enacting coalition. One view
is that this is the wrong outcome in itself; but even if one does
not hold this view, one must recognize that judicial deference to
the signing statement would create all kinds of difficulties. Next
time around, Congress knows in advance that the president will
say one thing (or nothing) prior to the vote and something else
after the vote. As a result, Congress may vote down bills whose
compromise meaning it supports. Another possible consequence
is that members of Congress will need to extract a commitment
from the president not to advance a new interpretation in the
signing statement. Even if the president can make a credible
commitment, the additional bargaining costs are a deadweight
loss. A third possible consequence is that Congress will need to
expend additional time and energy crafting a bill that is detailed
enough to foreclose an interpretation the president would be
likely to advance in a signing statement. In these ways, giving
weight to the signing statement interferes with desirable legislation without having an offsetting benefit.
This is the argument of McNollgast and other authors. We
think it suffers from several difficulties.
First, the president's statements in general are more credible than those of members of Congress because the president is
a more significant and visible figure, and he is more of a repeat
player; thus, he has more to lose if he loses credibility. A president whose signing statement violates legislative bargains will
have more trouble obtaining Congress's cooperation later on.
He also might earn the distrust of other political actors and voters. In other contexts McNollgast seems to agree that general
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considerations of reputation encourage political actors to be
honest. They point out that committee chairs have an incentive
to be honest because they fear retaliation by the con9ressional
leadership which can deprive them of their positions. 49 But if
this is true for committee chairs, it is also true for the president.
Congress, members of his party, interest groups, and other parties with something at stake in the legislative process will refuse
to cooperate with him in the legislative process if he reneges on
earlier deals by issuing inconsistent signing statements.
Second, the president's signing statement is not like the
statement of a member of Congress who is outside the enacting
coalition or who has no incentive to speak sincerely because the
vote is past. The distinction is that the president will usually have
a significant role in the administration and enforcement of the
statute, whereas the member of Congress does not. 150 This is true
for an ordinary criminal statute that is enforced by U.S. Attorneys or the Justice Department; regulatory statutes that are enforced by administrative agencies such as the EPA; and even
laws creating private rights of action, at least to the extent that
these laws overlap with other statutes that the president enforces
or have some relationship to the president's constitutional powers such as his authority over foreign relations.
Thus, the statute in question may delegate authority to the
president, and even when it does not do so formally it will usually quasi-delegate, in the sense of implicitly permitting the
president to use discretion in enforcing the statute. Political scientists generally support delegation from Congress to the president, citing the advantages for Congress to leaving difficult policy questions to expert agencies that build up institutional
capacity in particular areas of policy. 151 In doing so, Congress
takes the risk that the president will direct agencies to enforce
laws in a manner that deviates from Congress's intent, but Congress can reduce this risk in two ways. First, it can use the Senate's advice-and-consent power, as well as Congress's general
authority over personnel decisions, to ensure that the agency's
149. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 138, at 26; see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS
265 (1994).
150. See Cross, supra note 1, at 218. However, Cross is more skeptical than we are
because he fears opportunism on the part of the president. /d. at 224. We address this
concern below.
151. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE
POWERS (1999).
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preferences do not diverge too far from Congress's. Second, it
can monitor the agency's behavior and use the diverse tools at its
disposal-control over appropriations, oversight hearings, refusal to cooperate with the executive in subsequent legislative
initiatives, providing for judicial review, 152 impeachment, and so
forth- to punish agencies that interpret laws in a manner that
diverges too far from Congress's intention. Congress does not
exercise perfect control over agencies, but the enormous advantages in institutional division of labor outweigh the costs.
For similar reasons, conventional wisdom approves of quasidelegations of power to the executive whenever statutes that require executive enforcement are enacted. Prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of criminal statutes is just one of many
manifestations of this view. 153 When prosecutorial discretion is
abused, Congress can use its oversight tools to retaliate against
the executive. So the possibility of exercising that discretion in
advance, in the form of a signing statement, should not raise any
concerns. Rather than classifying signing statements as insincere
forms of legislative history, one can more usefully think of them
as policy statements by the executive that are constrained in the
same way that all other exercises of delegated authority are.
Third, as noted above, PPT's main assumption-that legislative cost reduction is the goal of canons of statutory interpretation-ignores serious controversies about the legislative process.
An alternative view is that the president more accurately represents the preferences or interests of the public as a whole than
Congress does, because only the president has a national constituency.154 If we reject PPT's extreme pro-Congress assumption, then it is simply ambiguous whether the additional bargaining power that the president receives in a world in which courts
give weight to signing statements enhances or reduces public
welfare.

152. If Congress is worried that a president will misinterpret or decline to enforce/comply with a statute (whether through a signing statement or not), it can (within
the broad bounds of Article III standing) provide for judicial review. Importantly, it did
not do so in the Detainee Treatment Act - indeed, it did the opposite. Senator Specter
recently introduced legislation that would purport to give Congress standing to seek judicial review of claims made in presidential signing statements and direct courts to ignore
signing statements when interpreting legislation. See Presidential Signing Statements Act
of2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006).
153. See, e.g., Lupton, supra note 121.
154. For a recent summary of the vast literature that takes this view, with pertinent
citations, see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of The Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1226-31 (2006). Nzelibe himself rejects this view.
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Although the danger of post-enactment opportunism by the
president is real, this is something that can be constrained by
courts. Courts can decide to give more or less weight to the
president's views relative to Congress's when deciding how to
interpret a statute. Courts that believe that the president has better incentives than Congress might give more weight to the signing statement than to ordinary legislative history, but that does
not mean that the court would accept any kind of signing statement. Taking a cue from Chevron, 155 a court might give weight to
a signing statement that provides a reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute. Courts can also evaluate the credibility of
the interpretive signing statements based on a variety of factors
including consistency with prior signing statements and with
statements by the president and other executive officials in the
legislative history, the consistency of signing statements with the
statements of members of Congress in the legislative history, the
extent to which the statements generate disagreement from
members of Congress, and so forth.
We can join the second and third points under the general
claim that in the post-Chevron world signing statements are no
more objectionable than exercises of presidential power that are
now seen as routine and uncontroversial. Chevron dealt with
formal delegations of power from Congress to the executive
branch; but its rationales for judicial deference to executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes in such cases can be extended to signing statements. The two rationales for Chevron
deference were the superior accountability and expertise of the
executive. 156 Our first point was about expertise: the president's
enforcement authority gives him expertise about how statutes
should be implemented. Our second point was about accountability: the president is more accountable to the public than
courts are, and thus more likely to act in the public's interest. In
Chevron, the Supreme Court used these rationales to justify deference to the interpretations of agencies that have formal rulemaking or adjudicatory power. Similarly, the president's expertise and accountability provide courts with a reason to give
weight to signing statements rather than relying on their (the
courts') own ability to resolve ambiguous language. 157
155. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc .. 467 U.S. 837
(1984 ).
156. See id. at 865-66.
157. For a similar argument, see Cross, mpra note I, at 229-31. Political scientists
generally support congressional delegation of authority to agencies for Chevron-style
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As we have noted, this reasoning has, in fact, been used by
courts to justify deference to executive interpretations of statutes
in various settings outside the Chevron setting. For example,
courts give weight to executive interpretation of statutes that affect foreign relations. 158 Similarly, they give weight to executive
interpretations of treaties. 159 When an agency does not have the
power to issue formal rules that interpret the statute, the interpretation must be contained in other documents-memoranda,
proclamations, executive orders, internal guidance statements,
and so forth. If it is more convenient to advance these interpretations in signing statements, there is no reason to object to this
practice. Indeed, in some contexts it may be preferable to have
the president commit to an interpretation before specific controversies over the meaning of the law arise. In doing so, the President enhances transparency about his legal views and enforcement agenda. This proposition is also reflected in the
disallowance of Chevron deference to executive litigating positions, which seems to be based on the concern that litigating positions might not reflect the considered view of the executive, or
might be advanced for narrow political reasons. Because signing
statements generally are made in advance of any particular dispute, 160 and reflect the views of the president himself, it is less
likely that they are similarly tainted. 16

reasons. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 151. For a general discussion, see
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CH!. L.
REV. 1721 (2002). For an important exception, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Percjohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165 (1992), who argue that
Chevron upset the constitutional balance between the executive and Congress by enabling the executive to advance interpretations of statutes contrary to the enacting coalition's intention. In our view, Eskridge & Ferejohn give too little weight to Congress's
other means of control; do not adequately consider the possibility that economic and
technological changes justify a shift in power; and also cannot account for the fact that
Congress has continued to delegate substantial, discretionary authority to the president
post-Chevron. See also Kagan, supra note 14 (endorsing broad administrative powers for
the president on Chevron-like grounds).
158. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
649 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
159. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669,2685 (2006).
160. The signing statement issued in connection with the Detainee Treatment Act,
however, occurred while litigation was pending challenging the administration's detention policies in the war on terrorism. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Hamdan
disregarded the statement.
161. We are not claiming that signing statements are entitled to deference under the
Chevron doctrine per se. Among other things, the applicability of that doctrine to presidential interpretations, as opposed to agency interpretations, is unsettled. See Acree v.
Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 63 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring). More-
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C. COMPLICATIONS
So far we have discussed interpretive signing statements. In
this section, we expand our analysis by considering three additional issues. First, we address constitutional signing statements.
Second, we relax our assumption that courts give weight to signing statements, and address the view that even if courts do not
give weight to signing statements, it is still wrong for presidents
to issue them. Third, we consider the differences between signing statements and other types of executive documents such as
executive orders.
1. Constitutional Signing Statements
Many critics of signing statements have focused their attention on constitutional signing statements, statements that declare
that the president will interpret the statute in a certain way, or
not enforce certain provisions in the statute, because to do otherwise would violate the constitution. Critics fear that presidents
use constitutional signing statements in order to rationalize executive aggrandizement at the expense of Congress and other institutions. Consider President Bush's statement that he will interpret a bill that bans certain cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment of detainees in a way that does not interfere with his
commander-in-chief authority, implying that Congress cannot
prevent the president from ordering subordinates to engage in
such treatment during wartime. 162 Critics who believe that no
reasonable interpretation of this statute would violate the president's commander-in-chief authority assume that the president is
implicitly proposing more expansive powers than he already has.
And even when there is a potential conflict between the statute
over, in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Supreme Court held that
Chevron deference is appropriate only when it is "apparent ... that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law," id. at 229, and it is not clear when this expectation applies with respect to the president. Rather, our claim is simply that the rationales for deference under Chevron provide support for giving at least some weight to
signing statements, assuming that weight is given to other types of legislative history.
Even when Chevron does not apply, lesser types of deference may be appropriate, such
as "Skidmore deference," whereby the weight to be given to an interpretation "'will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade.'" Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
u.s. 134, 140 (1944)).
162. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense. Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricane> in the Gulf of 'Vkxico, and Pandc-mic Influenza
Act. ~1Xl6, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30. 21X15).
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and the president's constitutional powers, one might fear that
the president will use the statement to rationalize a refusal to enforce that statute even when no such conflict exists.
As we noted in Part III, a standard response to the critique
of constitutional signing statements is that the president has a
duty to comply with the Constitution-a duty that can be tied to
the Take Care Clause, if need be. Thus, if the president believes
that a statute violates the constitution, he has a constitutional
obligation not to enforce it. 163 (As discussed above, the president
may have a duty not to enforce an unconstitutional provision
even if he does not have a duty to veto the provision.) Announcing his view on this matter in advance, in a signing statement, is
surely preferable to waiting until litigation arises. By stating his
view in advance, the president gives Congress an opportunity to
correct the statute, and also helps align citizens' expectations
with the law as enforced.
A critic might respond that the president should not exercise independent judgment about the constitutionality of the
statute. Congress's implicit determination that the statute is constitutional is entitled to deference; or perhaps the president
should suspend judgment until a court has ruled. These are all
possible views, but they are hardly uncontroversial. Whatever
the truth, our point here is narrow, and should by now be familiar. The criticism is not of the signing statement but of the content of particular signing statements. If one believes that the
president has the authority to refuse to enforce statutes that he
deems to be unconstitutional, then the only possible objection to
a signing statement that says as much is that it comes too soon.
But we see no reason why the president should defer announcing
his view until litigation occurs. If one believes that the president
does not have the authority to refuse to enforce statutes that he
deems to be unconstitutional, that by itself is not sufficient for
criticizing the statement of his views in a signing statement. To
hold that position, one would have to believe that the president
would have to keep silent regarding his constitutional views
about a statute, a position held by no one of whom we are aware.
If the president has the right to state his views about the constitutionality of a statute, then he should state his views sooner
rather than later, in which case the signing statement would be
the appropriate vehicle. And if the president's views about constitutional power are excessive, a court is free to disregard them.
163.

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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The critic might also respond that the president should veto
bills that contain provisions that he believes to be unconstitutional rather than sign them and issue a signing statement announcing his intention not to enforce the offending provision. By
vetoing such bills, the president would discourage Congress from
enacting unconstitutional legislation in the first place. But nothing is gained though such a course of action, and much is lost.
Whether the president vetoes the bill or signs it but refuses to
enforce unconstitutional provisions, the unconstitutional provisions have no legal effect. Vetoing, then, just creates costsdelay of enactment of the constitutional provisions or indeed
failure of enactment altogether.
The basic fear seems to be that the president will use the
signing statement in an opportunistic fashion to advance impermissible theories of executive power, and that these theories
might stick even if courts do not pass on them or even if they reject them. How might such theories stick? We address this question in the next section.
2. Nonjusticiable Signing Statements and the Evolution
of Constitutional Norms
Even assuming courts do not pay attention to signing statements, or are capable of discounting those that make extreme
claims about executive power, there seems to be a lingering concern that the signing statement provides the president with an
excessively potent weapon in its continuing separation-of-powers
battle with Congress. The concern, discussed in Part II, that the
president could direct subordinates to disregard provisions of a
statute can be recast as a fear that the president can too easily
thwart the will of Congress. A related concern is that by persistently advancing claims about executive power against an often
weak-willed and divided Congress, the president will eventually
persuade Congress, courts, or others that he has powers that he
really lacks or ought to lack. So even if courts do not give weight
to signing statements, they cause harm to constitutional norms
and the division of powers between governmental units.
This argument is vulnerable to two objections. First, no one
fully understands how the president and Congress use their various institutional advantages to encroach on the power of the
other. Both sides have formidable tools at their disposal. The
president is the focus of the nation's attention; he delivers nationally viewed speeches; he controls the law enforcement activities of the executive branch; he can use executive orders and
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proclamations; he can use the veto against statutes that implicitly
deny him powers he thinks he has. In taking these actions, the
president can argue that his constitutional powers are, or should
be, greater than they in fact are (or should be), and if he persuades his audience, then his constitutional powers may indeed
advance. But Congress can interrogate executive officials in
oversight hearings; it can cut budgets, jurisdictions, enforcement
powers; it can require reports and audits; it can (though the Senate) vet nominees and refuse to confirm them; it can order investigations of the president and his subordinates; it can impeach
the president. Congress frequently passes bills with constitutionally dubious provisions that increase Congress's power: consider
its continued use of one-House and committee veto provisions
despite the Chadha decision. Congress frequently passes multiple bills and omnibus appropriations bills that contain numerous,
unrelated provisions. These bills put the president in a difficult
position. As a practical matter, the president may need to sign
these bills even if there are unconstitutional provisions. Yet it is
not self-evident that his behavior is clearly objectionable if herefuses to subsequently enforce an unconstitutional provision.
That this is a serious problem is recognized by many state constitutions, which require the legislature to pass single-subject bills
and give the governor a line-item veto. 164
Given that both sides already have numerous tools for advancing their constitutional understandings, and that one cannot
say whether the one side or the other has superior tools, whatever this might mean, it is impossible to say whether the signing
statement gives the president a significant advantage over Congress. It might give him no advantage, a small but reasonable advantage, or it might make up for numerous disadvantages.
Second, one's position on these issues must depend on the
resolution of a prior, equally difficult issue, namely whether the
president already has "too much" or "too little" power relative
to Congress. 165 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., thought that the presidency was too powerful when he wrote his book, The Imperial
164. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETI, supra note 135, at 330-31, 335-36;
Courtney Paige Odishaw, Note, Curbing Legislarive Chaos: Execurive Choice or Congressional Responsibiliry?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 227,230 & 241 (1988).
165. For discussion of this baseline problem, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separarion of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001). The literature on the constitutional cont1ict between the president and Congress is vast. See, e.g.,
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT (4th ed. 1997); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Jnrerprer? The Quesr for rhe
Ulrimare Consrirwionallnrerprerer, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986).
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Presidency, in 1973. By the year 1998, he had come to believe
that the president was no longer too powerful, but then he
changed his mind when he wrote the preface to a second edition
in 2004. 166 Schlesinger did not, at any time, provide a theory that
explains how much power the president should have, so his
judgments were no more than impressions. As we have noted,
the executive has gained power throughout American history,
and particularly during the twentieth century. Domestically, the
president has become the leader of the regulatory state since the
New Deal. Internationally, the president has increasingly enjoyed freedom of action, at least since the Spanish-American
War. One cannot criticize the use of presidential signing statements to aggrandize executive power without being able to establish that the president currently, under the right understanding of the Constitution and American political institutions, has
the right amount of power or too much. Far too much controversy exists on this issue for the criticisms of signing statements
to be persuasive along this dimension.

3. Executive Orders, Executive Memoranda, and
Proclamations
One of our recurrent arguments is that signing statements
are just one of many tools that the president has at his disposal
for controlling the executive branch. Other tools include executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, agency rules, and internal guidelines. To the extent that these other instruments are
near substitutes for signing statements, then even some kind of
prohibition of or taboo on signing statements, if this were possible, would have no effect on the conduct of the president. 167
However, we have not gone so far as to say that signing statements are identical to these other tools, and indeed they are not.
Accordingly, signing statements may indeed have significance.
The most interesting difference between a signing statement
and the other types of documents is that a signing statement attaches itself to a statute, and so (if given weight by courts as legislative history) may continue to have force after the termination
SCHLESINGER, supra note 32, at ix-xxiv.
See also T.J. Halstead, CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitwional and lnstiturionallmplications, at CRS-26 (Sept. 20, 2006) ("It does
not seem likely that a reduction in the number of challenges raised in signing statements,
whether caused by procedural limitations or political rebuke, will necessarily result in
any change in a President's conception and assertion of executive authority."), available
at http://www. fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667. pdf.
166.
167.
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of the administration, even if future presidents disavow it. For
comparison, consider the executive order. At the beginning of
their administrations presidents typically review executive orders
from prior administrations, and repeal or modify those that they
do not agree with. No one doubts that presidents can do this.
Signing statements are anchored to statutes; executive orders
float free.
Now, a president could also use an executive order to disavow a prior president's signing statement, or to instruct subordinates to disregard claims made in that signing statement. However, it is imaginable that in future litigation a court could rely
on the signing statement and disregard the disavowal. This could
happen if courts regard the signing statement as a part of the legislative history rather than as an independent statement of executive policy. When interpreting statutes, a court will rely on
legislative history to some extent, but it does not always pay attention to the interpretations of the current president. In this
way a signing statement could be a more powerful way to affect
interpretations of a statute than other executive instruments
are- even more powerful than a formal agency rule under the
Chevron doctrine, which permits new presidents to reject interpretations of earlier presidents.
We emphasize that this is a possible argument, and we do
not know how courts will act. But if courts do accept this argument, we think that this would on balance be a good thing. The
reason takes us back to the theory of statutory interpretation. As
long as the president is a member of the enacting coalition, then
his contemporaneous interpretation of the statute is entitled to
respect. Just as courts rely on the enacting Congress's intention,
not the intention of the Congress in session at the time of litigation, they should rely on the "enacting president's" intention,
not the intention of the president in office at the time of litigation. Indeed, courts do routinely rely on statements issued b~ the
executive branch regarding legislation under consideration.' 8
CONCLUSION
The critics confuse the medium and the message. The signing statement is a tool for expressing a president's view of a stat168. See OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 438 (2d ed. 1993) (noting the usc of testimony by executive branch administrators, their analvscs of bills, and messages from the president and his subordinates that
propose or comm~nt on pending bills).
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ute. The fact that presidents may use signing statements to advance erroneous views about their constitutional powers or the
meaning of a statute is not grounds for criticizing the tool, just as
policy disagreement about the use of the veto would not be
grounds for criticizing the president's veto power. Like all tools,
the signing statement can be used for good or for ill. Confusion
about this point is evident in the debate about whether Bush has
challenged "too many" statutory provisions in signing statements, when the appropriate question is whether Bush's views
about executive power are justified. 169
If courts do not give weight to signing statements, then the
objections to this tool are weak indeed. The signing statement is
no more offensive than the memorandum, the executive order,
and the proclamation, and no one seems to want to ban them.
Whatever one's views of presidential power, the president has
the right and perhaps even a constitutional obligation to state his
opinion about the meaning of a statute and whether it violates
the constitution. If it is more convenient to state this opinion in a
signing statement than in some other type of document, that is
hardly an objection. Indeed, stating his views about legislation at
the earliest possible point increases transparency about the executive's intentions, which enables those who are affected by the
statute to adjust their behavior accordingly, and those who disagree with the president to mobilize resources to litigate or obtain a legislative revision.
If courts do give weight to signing statements, then critics of
the signing statement should more appropriately complain about
judicial than about presidential practice. But to the extent that
courts legitimately defer or give weight to the executive's position on some issue, and this is very common as we have discussed, then it seems that use of the signing statement should be
encouraged rather than criticized. When the president expresses
his view in advance rather than in litigation, there is less of a
chance that the view is opportunistic or politically biased, as
courts have recognized. The signing statement should thus be
preferred to the litigation position. And occurring as it does at
the earliest point at which the president can express his views
about a completed statute (as opposed to bills earlier in the legislative process), the signing statement is an attractive vehicle for
doing so.
169.
A17.

See Walter Dellinger, Editorial, A Slip of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,2006, at
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We have also argued that if courts are correct to examine
legislative history, then a signing statement should be examined
as well, even though it comes after the vote. The president has
legislative power embodied in his veto, and thus his views about
legislation are entitled to some weight. The PPT models show
that because Congress legislates under the shadow of the veto, a
bill will reflect the president's view, even if only implicitly. And
because the president will almost always play a role in the enforcement of a statute, his views about it, as embodied in the
signing statement, are no more suspect than other instructions to
subordinates. Because he is a usually a pivotal member of the
legislative coalition, because he is usually charged with enforcement in the statute, and because his enforcement of the statute is
politically constrained, his statement will often provide useful information about the meaning of the statute.

